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This dissertation is concerned with how Antarctic research is made possible through complex 
and interdependent networks, institutions, and relations. It investigates the experiences, challenges, 
and concerns of a selection of Antarctic researchers and the conditions that enable them to conduct 
their research in addition to their participation within the Antarctic research community. Informed by 
material semiotic approaches, it is concerned with the enactment of Antarctic research through 
institutional and material structures and relations. Antarctic research becomes performed through a 
complex apparatus of interdependent networks. The issues and concerns raised allowed me to explore 
the materiality of research practices in the Antarctic, broader geopolitical contexts, knowledge 
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As the only major landmass uninhabited by humans, the impenetrably icy continent of 
Antarctica has been a source of great curiosity, inspiring heroic endeavours of exploration. From the 
very outset of its history of human engagement though, this former terra nullius, beyond the 
sovereignty of nations and empires, also became a site of scientific investigation. This was formalized 
in 1959 with the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, which designated Antarctica as a place for peace and 
science. Administered through an international framework, this stimulated a much more systematic 
and coordinated phase of scientific activity, now pursued by research institutions across the world 
through multiple national facilities established on the barren and inaccessible landscapes of 
Antarctica. Isolation, inclement weather, and an international governance regime present challenges 
and opportunities for engagement with the continent. This dissertation is about the processes through 
which Antarctic research is made possible. Adopting an anthropological mode of inquiry, I explore the 
practice of Antarctic research by considering the material and structural relations that come to enable 
such research, and the communities of practice and technocratic structures through which knowledge 
is produced.  
Considering the mobilisation of Antarctic research is a complex challenge requiring us to ask 
how research is enabled through interconnected structures, relations, and practices. It depends on 
international accords, governing institutions, material infrastructures, disciplinary expertise, and 
coordinated activity. Such concerns are not without precedent - social scientists have turned their 
attention to the investigation of scientific knowledge production for some time, considering for 
instance, scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1962), biological laboratories (Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Knorr 
Cetina, 1995), high energy physics (Nothnagel, 1996), marine microbiologists (Helmreich, 2009), 
planetary scientists (Messeri, 2011), climate scientists (Skrydstrup, 2013), and ‘limit’ biologists 
(Helmreich, 2016).  
This dissertation begins with an inquiry into the material relations and practices that enable 
Antarctic research. I employ an approach informed by John Law’s conception of material semiotics 
(2009) to describe the enactment of Antarctic research. I address the historic geopolitical contexts 
that govern and manage human engagement with Antarctica, including the technocratic structures 
through which knowledge is produced. I then explore the embodiment of science within the Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS) and its subsequent politicisation, and trace how Antarctic research emerges 
through heterogeneous relations between humans and nonhumans of all kinds across networks that 
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span the globe. I illustrate how technoscientific objects describe and translate the Antarctic 
environment into past histories, present truths and anticipated futures where Antarctic research is 
enacted, translated, practiced and embedded in the material relations that help produce it. 
The next chapter addresses Antarctic knowledge production and practice. Antarctic 
knowledge can be seen to be produced through specific epistemic and institutional structures and is 
grounded in time, space and place. I discuss how epistemics are a useful conceptual tool for analysing 
the institutional arrangements that shape Antarctic knowledge production. I illustrate the 
interconnections between knowledge, language and representation within Antarctic research 
communities, and how they can become a point of contention. Knowledge and language become 
implicated in hierarchies with the power to include or exclude certain practitioners. 
My final chapter explores the many temporalities of Antarctic research through an exploration 
of time, uncertainty and the future. I discuss how our ability to model and imagine the future is 
inextricably linked to societal stability and has temporal implications for foresight in a changing climate 
and in times of political uncertainty. Uncertainty emerges in Antarctic research in numerous ways 
through global geopolitics, climate change and funding contingencies. I illustrate how anticipation of 
the future emerges as we organise ourselves in the present, in relation to our past and to our unknown 
futures (Nielsen, 2011), always moving between multiple temporalities. We see an enrolment of 
technologies of anticipation within Antarctic research to meet the demands for predictive science 
where time and risk emerge together in abstraction elusive to management practices. 
This dissertation contributes to the body of social science work on human engagement with 
Antarctica, drawing on Science and Technology Studies (STS) and anthropological theory. It seeks to 
understand the ways in which research in and on Antarctica is made possible, and it does so through 
an ethnographic project that solicited commentary from expert practitioners. Materiality, knowledge, 
and temporality represented the key themes to emerge from analysis of the extensive interview 








 “Human experience is endlessly interesting because it is endlessly unique.” (Bernard, 2011: 458) 
Antarctica is a place socially, culturally, politically, and scientifically constructed in many 
spaces across the world. Antarctic research becomes enacted by disparate and mobile individuals, 
fragmented groups and communities of researchers working in locales away from the Antarctic. My 
‘fieldwork’ involved emailing potential participants, organising times and equipment, booking rooms 
and conducting semi structured interviews with those who responded to my requests. Much has been 
written about the nature of ethnographic research with emphasis placed on the necessity of going 
into the ‘field’ as the defining characteristic (Hastrup & Hervik, 1994). However, as Amit (2000) argues, 
anthropological experiences and conceptions of fieldwork are highly varied, fluid and more nuanced 
than traditional emphases on the ‘field’ and distinctions between ‘home’ versus ‘away’ would have us 
believe. Amit (2000: 11) goes on to argue that “it is the circumstance which defined the method rather 
than the method defining the circumstance” where for this research, semi-structured interviews with 
broadly defined ‘Antarctic researchers’ ex-situ from the Antarctic became my ethnographic fieldwork. 
I am concerned with the lived realities and experiences of Antarctic researchers, the day to day 
research practices, much of which take place in research institutes and universities around the world.  
The methods employed for this research consist of semi-structured interviews with Antarctic 
researchers forming my primary data complemented by literature analyses, in addition to 
observations from my own Antarctic fieldwork during a postgraduate course the year before and 
participation within a multidisciplinary Antarctic research centre within the University of Canterbury; 
Gateway Antarctica. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 13 Antarctic researchers, 
spanning across disciplines including marine biology, microbiology, glaciology, geopolitics, history and 
social science research. Semi-structured interviews allowed for fluidity of conversation and the 
freedom to respond organically to interview responses, Galletta (2013: 45), for example, describes 
semi-structured interviews as a “repertoire of possibilities”.  
Interviews took place within meeting rooms at the university in Christchurch, in a research 
laboratory in Wellington, over Skype, and over the phone. Interviews were roughly 90 minutes, with 
the shortest interview 45 minutes and the longest two interviews almost two hours. The interviews 
were audio-recorded using a dictaphone. I then produced verbatim transcripts of the interview 
recordings, which amounted to a total of 179 pages of verbatim transcribed data. Transcribing the 
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interviews myself took an extraordinary amount of time but did mean that I became very familiar with 
the transcripts during the process, making notes and identifying commonalities before I came to 
analysing and coding the data more formally, I became grounded in the data. 
Analysing Primary Data: Finding Themes 
 
I identified themes and common threads using a combination of deductive and inductive 
coding, anticipating some themes and allowing the transcripts to inform others. My identification of 
themes in the transcripts was heavily influenced by a grounded theory analysis approach that was 
originally developed by Glaser and Strauss ([1967] 2008). In grounded theory approaches through 
familiarity with, in this instance, the interview transcripts one becomes grounded in the text (Bernard, 
2006) and “coding is analysis” (Miles et al., 2014: 72). I coded my texts using a combination of 
abstractions and empiricisms. For example, if participants were discussing a loss, expressing 
uncertainty, making a prediction, or describing a challenge, these were coded as such. In other cases, 
where direct reference was made to, for example, funding, language or governance, these too became 
codes accordingly. I also began memoing during the transcription process as I coded. Memoing 
involved making notes as thoughts and ideas emerged about my themes and possible connections 
between them (Bernard, 2011).  
Challenges, Concerns & Obstacles 
 
I initially intended to explore the production of scientific knowledge on the Antarctic but 
decided to broaden this for a number of reasons. Firstly, I did not want to recreate the binary that too 
often separates the social sciences from the natural sciences for I believed that, within Antarctic 
research, the lines were blurred (a point I will return to in chapter four). Secondly, I wanted to 
interview a number of political scientists and governance experts, who were interested in my work, 
and a focus specifically on the natural sciences may not have allowed this. Furthermore, differing 
disciplinary subjectivities meant the language of my research was less attractive to natural scientists 
(another point explored in chapter four). Of the over 50 researchers I approached at least 80% were 
natural scientists, but of those interviewed only one third were natural scientists, which in itself 
necessitated a change of direction. I will provide an example: 
Early on, I was describing my research to one of my natural science colleagues at university. I 
discussed how I was planning to look into the production of scientific knowledge in the Antarctic and 
explore the material relations that enable the science and scientific practice. They listened attentively, 
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nodding occasionally. When I finished my explanation a few moments passed, when finally they said 
‘it sounds like you are suggesting that it [the scientific method] is wrong’. This told me a number of 
things. First, the differential intelligibility of the very idea of social studies of science would be a barrier 
to enticing natural scientists to participate in my research and, secondly, I suspect that I was likely to 
encounter a similar miscommunication with other natural scientists. In her PhD thesis, Jessica O’Reilly 
(2008) alludes to some of the difficulties of undertaking social research in an area where traditionally 
positivist natural sciences have held court.  I too encountered similar frictions. I had thought about 
this divide, of epistemological and ontological clashes but did not think it something so close to the 
surface, something I would encounter so readily. Latour’s Pandora’s Hope (1999: 2-3), opens with 
Latour, speaking after a conversation in which he was asked the question “Do you believe in reality?” 
at a conference. Speaking about that conversation and about a separation at the conference between 
‘scientists’ and ‘science studies’, he says: 
This division itself, announced by the organisers, baffled me. How could we be 
pitted against the scientists? That we are studying a subject matter does not mean that 
we are attacking it. Are biologists anti-life, astronomers anti stars, immunologists anti-
antibodies? I was a bit vexed to be excluded so casually… Then I realised I was wrong. 
What I would call “adding realism to science” was actually seen, by the scientists at this 
gathering, as a threat to the calling of science, as a way of decreasing its stake in truth 
and their claims to certainty… This distance between what I thought we had achieved in 
science studies and what was implied by this question was so vast that I needed to retrace 
my steps a bit. 
The above quote speaks to wider epistemological separations within academia generally, but 
also more specifically within the Antarctic research community and reflects some of my own 
experiences and observations as well as those revealed in some of my interviews. Thus, I decided it 
would be problematic to recreate a binary between the positivist natural scientists and humanities 
and social science scholars. Therefore, Antarctic research and researchers in the broadest sense 
became my focus. This study intends to provide insight into the many ways of both doing Antarctic 
research and being an Antarctic researcher, exploring the enablers and disablers, both human and 
nonhuman, through which Antarctic research takes place and knowledge is produced.  
Selection & Recruitment 
 
  Sampling was a combination of opportunistic and snowball sampling, with 
researchers approached initially via email with over 50 approaches made in total. Antarctic research 
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is disciplinarily diverse, and participants were selected for the experience and research interests on 
Antarctica. An attempt was made to capture researchers from a wide array of backgrounds, 
experiences and expertise spanning many academic disciplines. Table 1 gives an overview of 
participants, their area of research and affiliation and, the pseudonyms by which they will be referred 
throughout the dissertation. Recruitment of participants was less successful than anticipated as 
mentioned above which has directed and constrained the research, in addition to the length of time 
taken to transcribe the interviews which meant further participants were no longer sought sooner 
than expected. All of my interviews took place in English, and I acknowledge a bias in my sample 
towards researchers from the Anglosphere as they were more readily accessible to me. Further, I 
acknowledge that there is also a bias towards humanities and social sciences researchers who more 
readily responded to my topic of inquiry, I suspect, due to our more closely aligned disciplinary 
subjectivities as well as perhaps an appreciation for the sometimes difficult task of attracting research 
participants.  
Table 1: Research participants and their affiliation 
Pseudonym  Area of research Affiliation 
Emmanuel Social sciences University 
Francis Humanities University  
Morgan Biology Antarctic research institute 
Robin Social sciences University 
Johannes Glaciology University 
Lou Social sciences University 
Lindsey  Biology University 
Kerry Social sciences Antarctic research institute 
Jo  Humanities University 
Alex Social sciences University 
Matias Biology Antarctic research institute 
Maja Social sciences University 




Ethnographic research often captures personal information, views, and opinions, some of 
which may be compromising (Herbert, 2014). Therefore it is of paramount importance that the rights 
of participants are protected and considered throughout the life of the research project (DeWalt & 
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DeWalt, 2011: 211). Research participants have the right not to be harmed, to anonymity, to 
confidentiality and to privacy (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2011; Miles et al., 2014). My research involved 
interviewing Antarctic researchers in their professional capacity and sought their educated thoughts 
on matters that are well within their fields of expertise, with no personal information sought. My 
research qualified as low-risk, was approved by the Human Ethics Committee (HEC) at the University 
of Canterbury (reference HEC 2016/74/LR) and is consequently bound by its guiding principles (see 
HEC, 2014).  
Participants were selected for their connection to Antarctic research. Informed consent was 
gained prior to research participants involvement during which process they agreed to participate, 
acknowledging what participation involved and their rights throughout the research project. 
Participation in my research was entirely voluntary and consent could be subsequently withdrawn at 
any time during the research. Once transcribed, participants were given the opportunity to review 
and verify their transcripts. Participants’ identity and that of their institutional affiliations has been 










Antarctica has a rich history of research endeavour. Motivations for engagement with the 
Antarctic have changed considerably, from mapping new territories to be obtained during colonial 
eras of exploration, to geophysical and taxonomic classification and resource exploitation, to concerns 
of peace and militarisation, and to the present agenda of conservation and environmental protection. 
Scientific inquiry dominates and justifies human habitation in the Antarctic and has become the 
rationale for large expenditure on national Antarctic programmes (O’Reilly, 2008). Antarctica is used 
as a ‘laboratory’ for scientific research into climate change to an extent not seen on any other 
continent and, accordingly, research agendas share commonalities (Herr & Hall, 1989; O’Reilly, 2008). 
Due to its remoteness, its inclement weather and the high costs associated with undertaking in-situ 
research, the Antarctic is arguably a place premised for collaborative, co-ordinated and 
interdisciplinary research, i.e. the Antarctic lends itself to place-based and international research 
efforts over discipline-based and national research. Antarctic research (and Antarctic researchers) 
inform(s) environmental, in particular climate-change-related, policy and management strategies for 
Antarctica, it is therefore important to understand the networks in which Antarctic knowledge is 
produced and how such knowledge practices inform debate, governance and further research.  
Material semiotics is used here as a framework within which to explore the materialities of 
Antarctic research and how networks of Antarctic knowledge are produced. Materiality matters. 
Antarctic research is enabled through specific sets of agreements, institutions, histories, policies, 
relationships and funding. Historically, geopolitical contexts have produced specific modes of human 
engagement that influence access, operations and research in and on the continent. The relationship 
between Antarctica and science has been carefully constructed over the last century with 
“machineries of knowledge construction” (Knorr Cetina, 2007) employed in empirical processes 
through which Antarctic knowledges and subjectivities are embedded and produced. The materiality 
of science and the production of scientific knowledge has been considered a subject to be studied, 
from the pioneering work of Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ to Bruno 
Latour and Steve Woolgar’s (1979) ‘Laboratory Life’ and the discipline of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) that has subsequently grown around it. Antarctic research is dominated by positivist 
scientific inquiry, with quantitative methods of inquiry preferred over qualitative research methods; 
it is a place where objectivity and quantitative methodologies have come to be expected and 





Early sociologies of science and the more recent STS seek to “better understand the power of 
actors and normative influences on the practices of science” (Rodger et al., 2009: 662). Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) has been employed as an analytical tool for describing this “enactment of reality” (Law, 
2009: 141) through webs of heterogeneous relations between actors of all kinds, including human, 
non-human, living, non-living, objects, institutions, regimes, scales, geographies, systems, machines 
and technologies, with actor-networks embedded in empirical practice (Law, 2009). ANT and other 
material semiotic approaches do not distinguish between the agency of human and non-human 
actants, but consider all actions to be relational (Latour, 1996). In The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Kuhn (1962) argues that science is taught in a particular way leading to a particular kind 
of science being enacted and, as a result, we end up at with an amalgamation of scientific practices 
that come to constitute paradigms (Kuhn, 1962), or cultures of knowledge (Knorr Cetina, 2007). Early 
sociologists of science and scientific knowledge described the Social Construction of Scientific Facts 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1979), identifying how science is enacted and how, through processes of 
translation, we arrive at empirical scientific truth which resembles facts, devoid of the social (Latour 
& Woolgar, 1979). However, within STS we see a paradigm shift as the focus on materiality and 
practice challenged previous understandings of knowledge as socially constructed (Asdal, Brenna & 
Moser, 2007).  
‘Science’ can be understood as a product of heterogeneous material relations (Latour & 
Woolgar, 1979). Material semiotic approaches have been undertaken by many researchers to analyse 
the enactment of the material relationality of given research areas, offering, for example, sociologies 
of translation for a scallop fishery (Callon, 1986a), the electric car (Callon, 1986b), wildlife tourism in 
the Antarctic (Rodger et al., 2009), or an analysis of how Atlantic salmon has become enrolled in 
regimes of domestication (Lien & Law, 2011). Scientists are understood to participate and produce 
scientific cultures, which may be treated as cultures of normative practice.  
In an Antarctic context, significant logistic and operational challenges, in addition to the 
influence of global geopolitics and national interests, have enabled certain kinds of research while 
simultaneously stifling others. The processes through which research is enabled begin well before any 
researcher reaches the Antarctic continent. Antarctic research is multifaceted and complex with many 
layers of epistemological influence (as will be explored further in chapter four). This research seeks to 
understand the role of matter and meaning for understanding the enactment of research practices 
and the subjectivities they produce for practitioners within Antarctic research. It also discusses how 
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research practices inform and are informed by paradigmatic shifts and competing epistemological 
influences and how we arrive at a specifically Antarctic subjectivity. 
Geopolitical History 
 
The rules of engagement with the Antarctic were outlined in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and its 
associated agreements, including the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection (Madrid Protocol) 
and its supporting annexes. The Treaty reflects the global Cold War geopolitics of the time, whereby 
the global political order was configured by the rivalry between superpowers and the ideological 
battle over democracy, capitalism, and socialism. For example, the Treaty bans militarisation, 
establishes a condominium with regard to sovereignty and territorial rights in the Antarctic, enables 
inspections of national Antarctic research facilities and vessels and, encourages international scientific 
cooperation as central to Antarctic engagement, thus cementing ‘science’ as the raison d’être in the 
Antarctic (Dodds, 2010; Elzinga, 2013) and embodying science within the governance system. The 
Treaty becomes enacted through participatory practices within the system and through the creation 
of policy through webs of relations connecting various state actors. The provisions of the Treaty have 
led to the often cited phrase that Antarctica is a continent for ‘peace and science’, and it is the 
interpretation and operationalisation of this rhetoric that continue to influence Antarctic research. 
Understanding the historic geopolitical contexts through which the Antarctic Treaty was 
conceived and developed into the Antarctic Treaty System is crucial for assessing contemporary 
governance issues in the Antarctic (Dodds, 2010; Dodds & Collis, 2017) and the enactment of new 
modes of human engagement as expertise shift as knowledge builds. Engagement with the Antarctic 
can be divided into a number of significant phases: beginning with ‘Colonial’ Antarctic exploration 
during the early 20th century, the International Geophysical Year (IGY) leading to the signing of the 
Antarctic Treaty in 1959, and new concerns about the exclusive nature of Antarctic governance arising 
during the 1980s prior to the signing of the Madrid Protocol in 1991. The values pursued during these 
different periods of time significantly influenced how Antarctica is governed and managed. They also 
influenced what kind of research would be undertaken on the continent. As Dodds and Collis (2017: 
51) argue: “the metaphorical and material power of the ‘Antarctic frontier’ is not something buried in 
the past; it continues to underpin contemporary manifestations of polar geopolitics”. The interplay 
between temporalities and their manifestations in and on the Antarctic are explored in greater depth 
in chapter five.  
Power relations and the mechanisms through which they are upheld within the ATS are 
multiple. Elzinga (2017: 107) discusses how “the IGY’s sublimation of political rivalry into scientific 
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competition and cooperation was distinctive”. Dodds and Collis (2017: 51) describe the Antarctic 
Treaty and ATS as a “form of colonial-scientific governance”, while O’Reilly (2017) speaks of 
“technocratic governance” and “epistemic technocracy” to describe a “mode of governance whose 
political technologies rely on the form (the discursive habits) and matter (the literal substance) of 
scientific practice” (O’Reilly, 2017: 6). Here we see an interplay between political legacy and scientific 
knowledge and expertise recreating, participating in and enabling a form of hegemonic governance. 
“Politics is seen as a form of practice which comes into existence through a large number of material 
arrangements and technical objects” (Asdal et al., 2007: 44). Technoscientific governance for the 
Antarctic involves an ideal of science-informed policy that takes into account scientific knowledge and 
expertise, thus legitimising the governance regime where the bureaucratic rituals and procedures of 
policy creation are enacted by various actors within webs of heterogeneous relations in the wider 
Antarctic research and policy communities and within national governments (O’Reilly, 2017). 
Geopolitical discourses in the Antarctic have moved from settler colonialism to scientific 
internationalism through the Treaty which “masked rather than resolved underlying tensions and 
ambitions, and reinforced unequal power relations and patterns of domination, albeit through 
scientific-political and technical discourses and practices” (Dodds & Collis, 2017: 59). Moreover, the 
‘scientific criterion’ for becoming a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty further perpetuated the 
politicisation of Antarctic science and, as Elzinga (2017: 106) argues, “science acquired symbolic value 
as political capital”, a point I will return to shortly.  
The persistence of colonial legacies and the privileged status original signatories to the Treaty 
continue to enjoy have been heavily critiqued (Dodds & Collis, 2017; Hemmings, 2017; Dodds, 2010; 
2017a; Elzinga, 2013) and, as Dodds and Collis (2017: 52) contend, “colonial institutions, discourses, 
and practices are part of the here and now and not confined to a distant historical epoch”, a privileging 
which serves both to enable certain research and researchers whilst simultaneously disabling others. 
Authority becomes established and subsequently reinforced through assemblages of technocratic 
experts and diplomats who create policy through the ritualised processes of Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), intersessional discussions, hallway conversations and drafted 
documents which in turn inform practice on the ground in the Antarctic (O’Reilly, 2017). Antarctic 
futures are formed through these policy making processes (O’Reilly, 2017). A more thorough account 
of the geopolitics of the Antarctic Treaty is outside the bounds of this dissertation and has already 




The equity and legitimacy of the ATS has been questioned virtually since its inception. Many 
scholars (Hemmings, 2014; 2017; Dodds & Collis, 2017; Elzinga, 2013) criticise the fact that decisions 
for the future of the continent are made by a select few, excluding much of the global south, most 
notably illustrated through the raising of the ‘Question of Antarctica’ at the United Nations by the 
Malaysian government in 1983 (see Beck, 2006a for further detail and significance). The governance 
structures of the ATS perpetuate such inequity by allowing or disallowing membership through the 
enactment of historical policies outlined in the Treaty. States that have historically held a privileged 
position within the ATS fear a diminishing of their power and influence within the order that they 
created and from which they have benefitted (Hemmings, 2017). Thus, the enactment of the historical 
order continues as national interests are articulated at meetings of experts from signatory states. 
Furthermore, the Antarctic interests of many non-Western states, in particularly Asian states, are 
viewed as “intrinsically suspicious” (Dodds & Collis, 2017: 64) and, as Hemmings (2017: 507) notes, 
“science is international and value-free until it isn’t one of us doing it”.  
The idea of ‘Polar Orientalism’ (Dodds & Hemmings, 2013), which I will discuss in greater 
depth in chapter five, draws attention to the many ways in which Asian and non-Western interests 
provoke suspicion from the Western world about their Antarctic interests and activities (Dodds & 
Hemmings, 2013; Hemmings, 2017; Dodds & Collis, 2017). The ATS has becomes an increasingly 
complex and multifaceted governance regime and, as Elzinga (1993a: 91) argues, “science does not go 
unaffected by its embodiment in an international regime having distinct political purposes”.  
The Politicisation of Science 
 
“Science in its own right is never enough to motivate a mobilisation of resources and efforts on the 
scale seen in Antarctica” (Elzinga, 2017: 104). 
The embodiment of science within the ATS plays a pivotal role in the functioning of the 
governance regime (Elzinga, 1993a; 1993b; 2017; Hemmings, 2017; Herr & Hall, 1989), and has been 
termed the “currency” of the Antarctic (Herr & Hall, 1989) as well as “symbolic capital” (Elzinga, 2017: 
107). Whilst Article II of the Antarctic Treaty inscribes “freedom of scientific investigation”, thus 
assigning science its central role, it is the “substantial scientific research activity” referred to in Article 
IX that is often interpreted as the ‘scientific criterion’ enabling certain states’ Antarctic involvement 
whilst disabling others through the material practices of actually enacting (substantial) science in 
Antarctica. Elzinga (2013: 194), for example, discusses how science (and the scientific criterion) came 
to be used as a “political tool to restrict membership in the system”, leaving the original signatories 
with an effective monopoly over the Antarctic (Elzinga, 1993a), where claimant states have justified 
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their privileged status under the guise of scientific objectivity (Dodds & Collis, 2017). Elzinga (1993a: 
79) goes on to argue that “there is a vast gap between the ideal of disembodied science… and the 
embodiment of research within the “realpolitik” of the ATS” (original emphasis). The ATS is where 
authority, expertise and power are exercised over the Antarctic. An Antarctic research base therefore 
came to take on symbolic meaning bolstering the rights of those within the claimant community and 
providing a mechanism for inclusion vs. exclusion (Dodds & Collis, 2017; Elzinga, 2013). It should be 
noted that the ‘scientific criterion’ position has subsequently softened, and an early interpretation of 
Article IX as requiring a research station in order for a state party to apply for consultative status is 
not necessarily the case anymore (Elzinga, 1993a, 2013).  
Among those Antarctic researchers interviewed opinions varied on the significance of the 
peace and science rhetoric inscribed within the Treaty. Robin, who has spent an entire career engaged 
in Antarctic affairs, working across multiple states, feels: 
From its inception, the one thing that giving science such a central role in the 
Antarctic system did was politicise it. Because it made it the thing you did in order to have 
influence and by which you are recognised as having influence and it was the basis for all 
those Para Antarctic institutions that developed like SCAR… part of my concern about the 
sort of nationalistic trend is that that will alter the nature of the politicisation that it will 
mean that the Antarctic science is even more a kind of a spear holder for the national 
interest in Antarctica, we shall see, it’s happening slowly. At the level of individual 
scientists, I don’t think it is very well developed, I don’t think nationalism is very well 
developed, I think it’s really at the level of the kind of institutions. 
Kerry who heads an Antarctic organisation, however, opines that 
The rhetoric that the continent is set aside for peace and science is more 
important to the governance arm of the system not to the science or the research arm in 
my view. 
Discussion of the politicisation of science in the Antarctic does not negate the quality of the 
science nor suggest it is not valuable. On the contrary, “for science to be able to function in its symbolic 
mode, it has to be accepted as quality science within an international scientific community. Scientific 
credibility is needed to underwrite political credibility within the ATS” (Elzinga, 1993a: 96). The quality 
of science need not be eroded by its position as political capital; quality science and political science 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather serve to demonstrate commitment to the Treaty (Roberts, 
Howkins & van der Watt, 2016a). 
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Scientific research in the Antarctic has become increasingly international and, where in the 
past Antarctic research was ad hoc and there was much duplication, presently research is more 
directed and coordinated, with the roles of the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) and 
the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) more established and understood (Elzinga, 
1993a, 2017). There are many examples of scientific internationalism and collaboration through the 
sharing of equipment, personnel and logistics in the Antarctic, but there are no truly international 
stations. In this sense, international scientific collaborations are grounded in the material practices 
and encounters in the Antarctic and through relations between scientists, researchers and National 
Antarctic Programmes (NAPs) rather than state governments. Elzinga (2013), Hemmings (2011) and 
the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC, 2014) have been critical of stations still flying 
national flags. In 2011 Hemmings penned a piece titled ‘Why did we get an International Space Station 
before an International Antarctic Station?’, which is critical of states’ (both new and old Antarctic 
players) commitment to national autonomy over international scientific cooperation. Elzinga (2013: 
193), too, analyses this mismatch between an ideal of scientific internationalism and a reality of vested 
national interests. Scientific internationalism often operates as scientific competition at the state level 
with the actualities of scientific internationalism enacted in the field. In the Antarctic, we see ‘Science 
as the continuation of politics by other means’ (Elzinga, 1993b), operating and threatening to 
undermine international cooperation. 
Intentionality & Commitment 
 
The institutional dimensions of research networks are important enablers. Institutional 
motives are revealed in the Antarctic through different modes of human engagement via scientific 
exploration, from early concerns over mapping and taxonomic categorisations during the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, and changing over time to more conscious efforts around environmental and 
conservation provisions presently (Elzinga, 2017). “Research programs are entrenched in institutions” 
(Elzinga, 1993a: 77), and these institutions, in particularly NAPs become gatekeepers either allowing 
or disallowing access to the continent for certain research. The epistemic and institutional structures 
within which Antarctic knowledges are produced are explored in the next chapter. 
“It is not altruism and scientific internationalism that has been a key element in the ATS. 
Rather national interests remain as both enabling and constraining factors” (Elzinga, 2013: 203). The 
material reality of Antarctic research requires large scale mobilisation of actors and capital. NAPs are 
themselves constrained within, for example, national agendas and funding cycles. The intentions and 
ongoing commitment of nations to the Antarctic Treaty came up repeatedly during the interviews. 
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Kerry and Lou, both with significant engagement with the ATS, had quite different interpretations of 
the operation of the ATS in its current form. Kerry continues seeing a strong commitment to the 
Treaty, while Lou was more critical, believing: 
There are gaps… if one tries to take a fairly objective view and an assessment of 
what’s working and what’s not working in the governance and policy system you could 
identify a number of things: the slow pace of decision-making and reaching agreement on 
things is obvious, the liability annex took 13 years to negotiate and has not yet entered 
into force even, where are we now, 12 years after we agreed the liability annex, I think 
still less than half the parties have taken the necessary action to bring it into force, so 
that’s frustrating, it doesn’t tend to demonstrate intent on the part of countries to commit 
to the system.  
Lou draws our attention to the abstraction of time and the differences in time between policy 
creation and agreement within the ATS and the time to align and adopt policy at domestic levels in 
order to bring policy to life. In this instance, negotiation of the liability annex (Annex VI to the Protocol 
on Environmental Protection) began in 1992 by legal experts on liability as intersessional work and 
was discussed at regular ATCM sessions first in 1998 in Tromsø (Vidas, 2002).  The liability annex was 
then agreed upon and adopted at the 2005 ATCM, but has not yet entered into force as Lou discusses. 
There is tension amongst actors where individual delegates and researchers negotiate, draft and 
achieve consensus within the system for a policy to remain in limbo while national governments align 
policy, decide whether their national interests are threatened and assess the risks. Thus, there is a 
frustration expressed and tensions apparent in light of differing timescales: policy debate and creation 
time and political and bureaucratic government response time (Helmreich, 2016). Within the ATS, 
consensus operates as both, an enabler of participation and inclusivity and a disabler of pace, as 
networks of vested national interests threaten to spill over into the Antarctic via commercial and 
national interests in, for example, the fishing industry. These tensions between urgency and slow pace 
were a recurring theme through my interviews and will discussed further in chapter five. 
An indication of the relative intentions and commitment of given Antarctic states can be seen 
through the levels of investment in infrastructure. These material indicators of logistical accessibility, 
are readily transformed into symbols of power, prestige and influence. The Australian government 
provides a useful example. The recent U-turns by the Australian government first on the climate 
science job cuts at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) (Dodds, 
2017b), and more recently regarding the closure of the permanent research station on Macquarie 
Island (Frydenberg, 2016a; 2016b), show a concern for prestige, influence and reputation. The job cuts 
16 
 
at CSIRO and the closure of Macquarie Island facilities drew international headlines and condemnation 
from the wider climate science and Antarctic communities (Open Letter to the Australian Government, 
2016). The government’s decisions were particularly audacious and awkward (to use Dodds’, 2017b 
term) as they were occurring in the months after the Paris Climate Change negotiations of late 2015. 
In both instances, the government has since changed its position, with fewer jobs losses than initially 
earmarked (Dodds, 2017b; Gough, 2016) and a $50 million upgrade announced for Macquarie Island, 
which is no longer facing closure (Frydenberg, 2016b). In both instances concerns over funding were 
initially cited, with the implication that funding was an issue, until Australia was no longer seen as a 
leading player (a) in climate science, (b) in combatting climate change and (c) in East Antarctica, i.e. 
the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) (Dodds, 2017b). A tension is revealed here as Dodds highlights 
in the case of CSIRO as “an organisation struggling over a number years to reconcile public service 
science with the pressures imposed by national government and a broader trend towards the 
privatised science regime” (Dodds, 2017b:25). Similar assertions could arguably also be made about 
the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD). Far from institutional autonomy, we see here how political 
motivations, intentions and commitments from governments enable Antarctic and climate research 
but also how those same governments are scrutinised by an international community who wield 




Logistic & Infrastructural Support 
 
Antarctic research is politically determined. Elzinga & Bohlin (1993) and Elzinga (2013) for 
example describe the impact of an organisations institutional motives operating within polar science 
and associated networks. For example, NAPs are the gateway institutions that provide access to the 
continent. It is therefore crucial that researchers have a relationship with an NAP in order enable their 
research. In turn, this accords NAPs a certain level of power over researchers by giving them the 
opportunity to vet the research to ensure it fits within their programme and capabilities and aligns 
with predetermined institutional motives. For example Johannes, a glaciologist describes the limited 
agency of the researcher within the logistical planning process where the NAP “decide what is required 
once they decide to support us.” 
Antarctic science is grounded in the material realities of the Antarctic, notably its distance 
from home countries, low temperatures and inclement weather. Logistical support in the Antarctic is 
therefore a fundamental enabler of in-situ Antarctic research, which in most instances is coordinated 
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solely by NAPs. The mobilisation of resources; infrastructure and personnel, provides scientists with 
the ability to collect data and samples, monitor sites and enact scientific practices in the Antarctic. 
Antarctic science is very much situated and embodied in the practices and liveability of the Antarctic 
continent, for which it relies on NAP operations, expertise and support. The physical location of NAP 
bases impacts research directions and abilities and is factored into research and experimental designs. 
Johannes for example discusses how research projects are constrained and designed to take place 
within the vicinity of the national Antarctic base. However, there is a desire to go further and 
improvements logistics and support capacity could enable this. 
The location of a base, the infrastructure and logistic support inform the science that is 
practiced and influence how the scientists are able to practice it. Furthermore, readily available 
specialist and banal facilities inform scientific practice in the Antarctic what Messeri (2011: 111) calls 
the “technological sublime and the technological mundane”. Morgan, a marine biologist discusses the 
ease with which experiments can take place as a result of laboratory space in the Antarctic:  
We’ll collect animals and we’ll do experiments on them really quickly because 
they’re as close to the condition they’re in the sea as you can get and the laboratory we’ve 
got… is designed so you can do that. 
When I enquired about the kinds of materials needed to enact Antarctic research, Morgan 
rattled off this list which very quickly gives a sense of the scale of the mobilisation of Antarctic 
research: 
We need the base, we need the boating facilities at the base, we need the diving 
facilities at the base, we need a really good aquarium and we need laboratories 
associated with that, so genetics, genomics laboratories, physiology, chemistry 
laboratories. For some of the work we need access to a larger ship because we need to go 
and look at different sites in the Antarctic... We need key personnel in all those areas; we 
need a good diving officer to support the diving, we need a good boatman as well to help 
us run the boats. Back [home] …we need the aquarium… we need the cold facilities… to 
run experiments there, we need again a suite of laboratories, we need funds to send our 
samples off for analysis in the genetics and the genomics labs, we need a whole bunch of 
facilities for the kind of smaller scale stuff that we do. 
Antarctic science requires a mobilisation of relations between all kinds of actors across many 
scales, localities and bureaucracies. It is a “choreography” (Law & Lien, 2012) of practice between 
international agreements and policies, scientists and support personnel and their respective expertise, 
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the field equipment, logistics support and the pathways for samples and data back to home 
institutions and, all ordered amongst the agencies of the ice, ocean and wind and, of Antarctica itself. 
Information Access & Support 
 
Aside from logistical support to access the continent itself, many Antarctic researchers work 
ex-situ where access and enablers take a more normative form. For example in the form of archives, 
artefacts, data, equipment, flights, funding, galleries, information, laboratories, language 
proficiencies, libraries, meetings, museums, papers, people, samples, support and time. Antarctic 
researchers who do not need to travel to Antarctica do not require the same relationship to an NAP 
nor scrutiny from them. The same question I asked Morgan earlier, about the kinds of materials 
needed to enact Antarctic research, I asked Robin who describes research requirements as follows: 
I just need not to be disturbed in a way and I don’t need any hard equipment, and 
I have 1000 books on the Antarctic... so what I need is time, my own time, but what I also 
need is access and openness to sources of information about policy decisions and that’s 
something that isn’t necessarily easy to get, varies with government agencies’ 
commitment to public disclosure and it’s also about contacts. I mean you raise a really 
valid point and this is one of the issues that came up in the SCAR review about priority 
research areas because one of the questions they were asking different constituencies 
within SCAR was what do you need by way of resources and humanities and social 
scientists have quite different needs really from somebody who needs tent on the snow 
and you know expensive electronic equipment. 
Here attention is drawn to the differing enablers of Antarctic research for different disciplinary 
subjectivities and settings. ‘Access’ requires different practices and differing bureaucracies, with for 
example access to information, openness and archives enabling for example historic Antarctic 
research. The differences in disciplinary subjectivities within the wider Antarctic research 
communities is explored further in chapter four.  
Funding was much discussed by all research participants and was a significant cause of 
consternation for researchers. It readily shifts from being an enabler to being a disabler, affecting 
researchers’ capacities to plan and envision their research into the future. Morgan discusses funding 
challenges:  
At the moment, it’s all funding, getting funding to do the research is crippling us. 
It used to be, up until about the 2000s it was facilities, we didn’t have good enough 
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facilities to do some of the things we wanted to do, and now we have got good enough 
facilities to do the things we want to do, but we haven’t got the money to employ people 
to do it, we haven’t got the money to pay for the consumables and things like that, so at 
the moment it is purely funding to do the research and to pay the salaries of the people 
involved, so we’ve got big funding cuts, we’re making people redundant, we’ve got to go 
out and win grants for all of our science and actually if you look at the track records of 
winning grants to work in the Antarctic, it’s poorer than it is for working outside the 
Antarctic and I think that’s because the referees in the research councils don’t see the 
questions in the Antarctic, especially in biology as being as important as the questions 
outside the Antarctic, so it’s much harder to win money for that. 
Funding networks are vast and within which research projects are brought into being or left 
in abstraction. Seeking funding involves an array of ideas, documents, expertise, deadlines, decisions, 
emotions, rituals and procedures holding the power to allow or disallow research. Of all those 
interviewed (with the exception of Robin who largely requires time), funding is what translates ideas 
into research projects and was discussed as the fundamental enabler of research.  
Technologies 
 
Specialist technologies are plentiful in Antarctic science, enabling scientific practice in ever 
more innovative ways. Technoscientific innovations came up repeatedly and were described in most 
instances as great enablers of improved research. Morgan, a marine biologist describes for example 
the changes in technology and what this means and has meant for their Antarctic research:  
Technology has made a big difference… there’s a whole new swathe of different 
experimental approaches, the theoretical side and understanding of how ecosystems 
function is changing rapidly, there’s a lot of technical change and in terms of things like 
our ability to observe things, the photographic side, the camera side’s improved massively 
and the improvement in the quality of the images you can get is changing what we can 
do a lot. I mean all of those sorts of things are just much better than they were. 
Johannes on the other hand discusses how technological changes have allowed the visitation 
of new sites and repeat measurements of old sites with improved accuracy. The Antarctic environment 
is described and becomes translated into data through use of technoscientific objects. There are 
numerous technologies enrolled in scientific practice. In the Antarctic, scientific practice is enacted 
and performed through the use advanced technologies as well as the more mundane such as tents 
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and vehicles. Antarctic science is materially heterogeneous and embodied in the relations between 
scientists, technoscientific objects and the Antarctic environment. Science “is shaped or constructed 
by human beings who deploy cultural and material tools to solve problems… [where] scientific 
experimenting is about lining heterogeneous components up for long enough to enact materials that 
can be detected, inscribed, and transcribed” (Law, 2010: 178 original emphasis). In the choreography 
of Antarctic science, many components need to line up within networks of relations spanning the 
globe. 
Johannes also discusses new capabilities through technological advancements and the 
networks of actors involved to ensure that access to, in this instance, satellite data continues:  
For my work it’s mainly data access from various space agencies to get the data 
we like, that also requires collaboration and application writing, proposal writing, but that 
is also in-kind support if you like, so there is no money flowing, but data flowing which is 
money for us pretty much, but for our work, yes that’s equally important. 
In Antarctic research, commercial, national and international frameworks are often 
entangled. For example, the satellite data Johannes’ research relies on provides a good example. The 
data is collected, stored and transferred through commercial, international and national pathways. 
Morgan too discusses access to equipment. For Morgan’s research, the technology is not new, but the 
layers of bureaucracy to gain access to it are: 
To get use of those now I have to get somebody in the University interested in 
doing a joint piece of work whereas 10 years ago I could have just gone and paid for the 
time on the machine and got one of my students do it, it doesn’t happen anymore that 
way. 
Thus, Antarctic research is performed through a delicate navigation between networked 
relations and ritualised procedures through which researchers gain access to data, people, funding 




“The power and ability to represent, translate and shape reality is neither centred in formal 
political institutions, nor in science. On the contrary, realities are created and enacted in many different 
locations, practices and relations, and the connections between them, and the coherence of what has 
been created, is not a given. The question of which enactments prevail and become more real is thus 
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an empirical question of the nature and character of the connections – and the boundaries – between 
different locations, practices and enactments” (Asdal et al., 2007: 36). 
Antarctic research is a choreography of practice (Law & Lien, 2012), weaving relations 
between funding bodies, archives, personnel, bureaucracy, technocracy, universities, institutions, 
policy and governments. The geopolitical history of the Antarctic has set the scene for human 
engagement with the continent, enabling and disabling certain research and participation. Science is 
embodied within the fabric of the ATS, and there is a resultant politicisation of science within the 
regime with nationalisms and competing institutional motives manifest in Antarctic research. Access 
to the continent itself in order to practice science sees a mobilisation of actors across overlapping 
scales and temporalities. The materiality of Antarctic research varies enormously depending on 
differing disciplinary subjectivities with funding a fundamental enabler, translating and making 
tangible research ideas and projects. The networks of heterogeneous relations in Antarctic research 
are multifarious, operating in localities across the globe and within international spaces and, become 









Knowledge became a recurring theme across my interviews; it was something possessed, 
gained, disseminated, valued and lost. Antarctic research is a busy and complex space of multifarious 
disciplinary subjectivities, epistemologies and languages. Antarctica is enacted through disparate 
research communities spanning the globe, who collectively have much in common as we see the 
construction of an Antarctic specialist subjectivity. Therefore, epistemic approaches help to address 
the practices and institutions through which Antarctic knowledge is produced across scale, place and 
time. There are disciplinary and linguistic tensions that emerge through dominant framings and 
interpretations of a continent for science and at international meetings through the language 
challenges of only four Antarctic Treaty languages. Certain knowledges and values become privileged 
through the epistemic structures of Antarctic governance and research. Antarctic knowledge is 




Epistemic cultures are “those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms – bonded through 
affinity, necessity, and historical coincidence – which, in a given field, make up how we know what we 
know. Epistemic cultures are cultures that create and warrant knowledge” (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 1 
original emphasis). 
Thinking in epistemic terms when addressing the production of scholarly and scientific 
knowledge concerning Antarctica is useful. Epistemics are a conceptual tool for analysing the 
institutional arrangements that shape knowledge production. There are a number of inter-related 
heuristic epistemic concepts that I will introduce and draw on as tools for understanding knowledge 
production in Antarctic research. Epistemic community and technocracy are more specific inflections 
that can be considered sub-sets of the broader epistemic culture. Foucault ([1969] 2002: 211) defines 
‘episteme’, as “the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the 
sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities”. This suggests that knowledge 
formations are predicated upon particular epistemological assumptions and are grounded within a 
given period in history. Building on the concept of episteme, Haas (1990: 55) develops the idea of 
‘epistemic communities’, which are defined as “a professional group that believes in the same cause-
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and-effect relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values.” The Antarctic 
research community is made up of many epistemic communities with many overlapping and shared 
values. For groups of Antarctic policy makers and the Antarctic governance regime, the focus shifts 
from constituency (the community of researchers) to its governing form (the political and 
technological apparatus that makes their practice possible) which O’Reilly (2017: 7) terms an 
“epistemic technocracy”, drawing attention to the political arrangements within which Antarctic 
epistemic communities are produced. The notion of epistemic communities direct our attention to 
the relations among practitioners, in contrast to the formal structures of possibility to which they are 
subject, which O’Reilly’s epistemic technocracy directs us to. Epistemic communities struggle to 
account for the embedded practices and institutions within which given epistemic knowledges and 
information are created and produced in addition to the material agencies within the process (O’Reilly, 
2017). Furthermore, O’Reilly (2017) discusses how the agency of actors and their capacity for influence 
within epistemic communities is not equal and where such ideals of shared and agreed upon 
knowledges lead to practices of inclusion and exclusion, relevant to disciplinary boundary-making. 
Epistemic cultures, developed by Knorr Cetina (1999; 2007) is a broader, more inclusive concept that 
captures both aspects emphasised by Haas and O’Reilly and in addition, has a material semiotic 
approach which I have also adopted for this research. Knorr Cetina (2007: 362) defines epistemic 
cultures as “the cultures of knowledge settings” and their “capacity to produce knowledge” (Knorr 
Cetina, 1999: 167). She argues that within STS, “if the focus in the early studies was on knowledge 
construction, the focus in an epistemic culture approach is on the construction of the machineries of 
knowledge construction” (Knorr Cetina, 2007: 363) and thus includes the object and material worlds 
and their agencies, as with material semiotic approaches, drawing attention to the understanding of 
both knowledge and culture as practice (Knorr Cetina, 2007). An epistemic culture approach is 
therefore useful for addressing knowledge production within Antarctic research because it 
incorporates the multifarious ways to practice research; including the different contexts, spaces and 
material realities. Epistemic cultures is therefore the preferred formulation for this research because 
it is best suited tool for analysis of a project based on interviews with members of cross-cutting 
epistemic communities who reflect on the technocratic apparatus that enables their work.  
Furthermore, Knorr Cetina makes a case for the larger scale of “macro-epistemics” 
acknowledging that “not all places of knowledge… are bound spaces” (Knorr Cetina, 2007: 367) and 
may involve “macro actors”. The Antarctic research community may be seen to share a macro-
epistemic culture, with a shared focus on Antarctica, with knowledge produced across different 
locations on the continent as well as in the Southern Ocean. Antarctic climate scientists too could be 
seen to belong to the macro-epistemic community of polar and global climate scientists, with a shared 
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consensus about the risks posed by anthropogenic climate change. Macro-epistemics are better able 
to account for the many different scales and capacities that build knowledges and produce 
information, as well as the practices and machineries through which these processes take place. In 
the Antarctic, O’Reilly’s (2017) ‘epistemic technocracy’ is useful because it more specifically directs 
our attention to the institutional infrastructure and governance of knowledge. Epistemic 
communities, whose deployment is more specific to analyses more concerned with the social than 
political approaches, draw attention to the shared values of professional groups, not dissimilar to 
disciplinary subjectivities. Epistemic cultures, highlight the settings, machineries and institutional 
arrangements of knowledge production through practice. Macro epistemics operate across an 
international scale and may be understood as “wider networks of knowledge generation” (Knorr 
Cetina, 2007: 361) and could include, for example, climate science communities and ‘macro actors’ 
such as the UNFCCC. Macro-epistemic cultures are made possible through the global assemblages of 
actors and institutions producing knowledge within micropractices (Knorr Cetina, 2007). An epistemic 
technocracy is more specific, referring to the governance arrangements where scientific and political 
expertise are shaped by and with one another, as is the case for the ATS. Epistemic technocracy is thus 
a useful term to be used in the Antarctic context (O’Reilly, 2017). 
We may wish to identify numerous epistemic cultures concerned with Antarctica. At the 
governance level for example, Elzinga (2013: 208) describes how “the decision making cultures in 
which they [NAPs] are embedded differ considerably between countries” (Elzinga, 2013: 208). The 
Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) provides an epistemic technocracy for 
NAPs that transcend national interests, and the SCAR may be seen to provide an epistemic culture for 
the wider community of Antarctic researchers. The more specific interplay between scientific 
expertise and governance within the ATS may be considered an epistemic technocracy (O’Reilly, 
2017). An epistemic approach offers many possibilities that can be developed and applied to a variety 
of concerns, for example in relation to community and in relation to technocracy. This repertoire of 
inter-related concepts allows us to consider the significance of communities, practices, structures, and 
spaces for research. 
Certain knowledges come to be privileged by epistemic structures, “by sustaining or 
discouraging certain epistemic outcomes” (Knorr Cetina, 2007: 362). Thus, conceptualising Antarctic 
knowledge production using epistemic framings is a useful way to address the wider contexts and 
institutional dimensions within which the knowledge is practiced and produced. In the Antarctic 
research community, the rhetoric of peace and science has become a means and justification for the 
privileging of positivist scientific epistemologies for Antarctic research (Elzinga, 2017; Roberts et al., 
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2016a). We may consider the politics of integrating specific kinds of epistemic community within the 
macro-epistemic culture of Antarctic research. Within SCAR, for example humanities and social 
sciences (HASS) have been incorporated within the system, an indication that the terrain is shifting. 
However, the group does not have the same standing as the natural sciences as Jo, an Antarctic 
humanities researcher discusses: 
I think it’s something that we’re seeing over society generally and this kind of 
raising up of science and we see it in conversations about the importance of STEM… just 
that really pushing of science, technology, maths this is the future and I think it’s ended 
up with something with a more narrow focus… In terms of Antarctica… I think that idea 
of peace and science has been used as more of a justification for that [privileging of the 
sciences] I know within SCAR certainly one of the difficulties we’ve encountered with trying 
to elevate the status of the humanities and social science group is people saying well it’s 
a scientific committee why don’t you go over to the humanities equivalent, which there 
isn’t one and that’s why the term social science can be really helpful even for someone in 
the humanities, I’ve used that to my advantage before. 
Here Jo, a humanities researcher, reveals an interesting insight into the fluid boundaries 
between domains and the possibility for researchers to make claim to typological identities in strategic 
ways, whilst also highlighting tensions encountered between academics of differing disciplinary 
subjectivities in addition to the institutional arrangements through which certain epistemologies 
become privileged. 
When differing epistemic communities’ boundaries rub up against one another, there can be 
a resultant friction between knowledge claims. This friction is perhaps best illustrated through the so 
called ‘science wars’. This refers to a period of discursive controversy in which scientific positivist 
accounts of objectivity were challenged by constructivist accounts of science as social, political, 
situated and partial and, where the turn to practice and language took place (Asdal et al., 2007). It was 
argued that facts are created by scientists at specific times and in specific settings through practice 
(drawing upon Kuhn’s idea of the paradigm) rather than truths about nature simply revealed or 
discovered, leading Haraway (1988) to speak of Situated Knowledges. STS scholars were critical of the 
“bifurcation of nature” (Whitehead, 1930) into nature/culture, human/nonhuman, subject/object and 
where nature became transformed and reduced to mere matters of fact (Whitehead, 1930; Latour, 
2004). These epistemological differences, and in some instances suspicions, may be reinforced by 
disciplinary boundaries.  
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  Figuring Antarctica as a metaphorical ‘laboratory’ adds further significance to the construction 
of Antarctica as the continent for science. The laboratory became a setting for many sociologies of 
science and gained importance as the space at the forefront of the scientific knowledge production 
effort as the “fact factories” (Knorr Cetina, 1995: 141) where many early sociologists conducted their 
fieldwork to understand “science in the making” (Asdal et al., 2007: 14) (see Knorr Cetina, 1995; Latour 
& Woolgar, 1979; Latour, 1983; 1987; 1988). Within STS “the laboratory has since achieved a position 
as the privileged, exemplary location in which to conduct studies of science, knowledge production 
and power” (Asdal et al., 2007: 9). Therefore, the metaphorical figuring of Antarctica as a laboratory 
is value laden, reifying and reinforcing a position of power and preference for the natural sciences. “A 
place is not "naturally" scientific, but must be established and maintained as such through social and 
political practice” (Messeri, 2011: 150). 
Situated Knowledges 
 
The peace and science rhetoric of the ATS sees a privileging of the natural sciences (Roberts 
et al., 2016a; Elzinga, 2016; 2017). Roberts et al. (2016a: 2) argue that “the implication is clear: unlike 
the rest of the world, with its complicated relations between people and nature, Antarctica is 
governed by an enlightened political order that acts both through and for science.” The experiences 
of many of my research participants suggests the privileging of natural science epistemologies and 
practices has resulted in a subsequent marginalisation of those in the humanities and social sciences 
with many comments speaking to a frustration at having been overlooked (Lou; Alex; Maja; Jo; Francis; 
Emmanuel; Karsten). Karsten for example recalls a meeting with the Antarctic scientific research 
community in the lead up to the 4th International Polar Year (IPY):  
It was the same patronising attitude from the natural science side… it’s very good 
if we can bring in some social scientists into our projects but we’d be kind of, social 
scientists would be kind of servants or handmaidens you know, a secondary position in 
relation to some project or problem as defined by natural scientists and we said no we 
don’t accept this… I remember these patronising attitudes one met at that time. 
The experience of Karsten is not unique amongst those interviewed, and I have had similar 
conversations during the course of undertaking this research. A situation not dissimilar to the one 
Latour faced at the beginning of Pandora’s Hope, with Latour lamenting in 1999 that we have far to 
go. Fittingly, Latour (1999: 295) goes on to conclude that “the science wars are only the latest episode 
in this polemical use of objectivity – and not the last, I am afraid”. The experiences of the Antarctic 
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HASS researchers interviewed suggest the preference for natural science is not only well established 
but has permeated through research communities and the general public alike.  
“Two centuries ago, it was the liberal arts and humanities that were thought necessary for 
informed public debates... The eclipse of a public role for the humanities since the mid-20th century 
has been prompted by a continuing current of positivism within our culture, which has simultaneously 
defined quantity as the measure of reality and devalued traditional notions of the public relevance of 
a liberal education.” (Frodeman, Mitcham & Pielke, 2003: 31). 
Therefore, within the ATS is useful to understand how the institutions and epistemic 
structures shape the conditions of practice and knowledge production. Jo discusses some further 
frustrations:  
I do also sometimes find it a bit difficult to get support for my project or get it kind 
of recognised as Antarctic research because it’s not going down there and drilling ice 
cores, or collecting krill or what some of my other colleagues do, so that is also a challenge 
to doing this kind of research about Antarctica I would say, like people’s preconceptions 
about what Antarctic research is… I’ve found it very hard… to get recognition that this 
kind of research is research… my institution has made life very difficult… it’s some of the 
structural stuff that has made it really hard. It’s pretty stupid, because it is Antarctic 
research. 
Maja, a social scientist simply states: “everything is in the name of science”. 
The Antarctic research community can be seen to share an epistemic culture, organising itself 
around an Antarctic commonality as evidenced through the biennial SCAR Open Science conferences 
in addition to the recent Horizon Scan which addresses future Antarctic research directions (which 
heavily lean towards the natural sciences, see Elzinga, 2016). The privileging of the natural sciences 
within the epistemic structures of Antarctic research communities, driven in part by policy demands 
for predictive science (as will be discussed in the next chapter), results in the false dichotomy of 
empiricism or constructivism and a valuing of certain research over others. The extent to which 
funding bodies and others in decision making positions subscribe, to or participate in (consciously or 
not), such privileging helps determine the kind of research pursued in and on Antarctica. The status of 
HASS disciplines on the periphery in Antarctic research affects researchers’ capacities to image 
possible research projects in the future. Pessimism, as expressed by Alex, a social scientist, who 




I feel like in Antarctic humanities, it’s just sort of beginning and there’s a lot more 
opportunities for research and for contributing to wider projects as well, for really saying 
something that maybe other disciplines, particularly something empirical like science, 
can’t say because of that ability to step back and look at the whole cultural context. 
Antarctic fieldwork has become something of a rite of passage for Antarctic researchers (not 
unlike fieldwork for socio-cultural anthropologists as touched on in the methods) as Howkins (2010) 
postulates in “Have you been there?” some thoughts on (not) visiting Antarctica. Going to the places 
we study confers a certain legitimacy, especially it seems, on one’s Antarctic research experience, 
which Howkins (2010) argues is undeserved. Roberts et al. (2016a: 6) discuss the prominence of 
explorers’ narratives which “perpetuated a sense that Antarctica was a subject best pronounced upon 
by those who had experienced it directly”. Within Antarctic research this becomes particularly 
apparent and speaks to a general interest in the continent (Howkins, 2010). Jo reflects on being asked 
the very question of “have you been there?”: 
What you do find a lot and I’ve talked to several of my colleagues about this, when 
they find out you do Antarctic research the first thing they ask is have you been or they 
assume that you haven’t, if they are a scientist they assume that you haven’t and then 
once you say well actually I have, you know that kind of, the level of respect accorded 
jumps up, and it shouldn’t be like that because it has nothing to do with the research or 
the quality of the research, that’s just like oh well I have therefore I know more… it’s 
always that question have you been and if yes then people automatically think that you 
more qualified to talk about that place. 
As Jo points out, the quality of the research is unaffected by having been there or not but 
rather symbolically functions as an indicator of group membership and a shared experience of a place 
with highly restricted access. The resultant insider/outsider dynamic favours the natural scientists who 
have greater representation in this exclusive club, keeping those in the HASS disciplines at the margins, 
as natural scientists’ research more often requires a trip to the ice.  
Leane (2011) argues that we are witnessing a cultural turn in Antarctic Studies with the 
breadth of research undertaken in both the humanities and social sciences at its greatest. In recent 
years, there have been a plethora of books published in the Antarctic HASS; Antarctica and the 
Humanities (2016), The Technocratic Antarctic (2017) and Handbook of Antarctic Politics (2017) to 
name a few and The Polar Journal continues to champion publications in Antarctic HASS fields (Elzinga, 
2016; Steel, 2015). There is a political manoeuvring of a minority constituency, the Antarctic HASS (an 
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epistemic community) within what can be considered a macro-epistemic culture, SCAR. Whilst Roberts 
et al., (2016a) aptly title their chapter: Antarctica: A Continent for the Humanities and Elzinga (2016, 
293) states: “the time for the Antarctic humanities has come”, and thus, it appears a call to action is 
here. 
Language 
Academic & Epistemic 
 
The epistemologies and disciplinary ways of knowing (our habitus) we develop have 
increasingly become barriers to interdisciplinarity. Epistemic communities as Haas (1990: 55) 
describes them share a “common vocabulary”, while epistemic cultures can be seen to share a 
common goal or desired outcome through differing “capacities to produce knowledge” (Knorr Cetina, 
1999: 167). The barriers to interdisciplinarity in Antarctic research are not unique. Antarctic research 
communities, however, are arguably well positioned by organising themselves as a place-based rather 
than discipline-based community through the construction of an Antarctic specialist subjectivity. 
There are commonalities in research agendas especially in the rubric of climate change. Karsten 
discusses the linguistic challenges posed by disciplinary differences: 
Interdisciplinarity as far as being able to integrate from different disciplines has 
been rather difficult… Some kind of commonality is needed, either the object of research 
looked at from different angles or else some methodology or integrative concept… 
However once researchers from mutually differing disciplines joined together in pursuit of 
a common body of knowledge or goal, when it got down to the nitty-gritty, it was found 
that scientists from different areas tended to talk past each other. The ideal of integrating 
knowledge met many barriers. 
As mentioned previously and as argued by Elzinga (2016: 288), “many natural scientists felt 
that the “human dimension” could be accommodated as a kind of “add on” factor – a token 
acceptance of our existence”. A similar feeling that prompted Latour (1999: 17) to claim that 
“scientists always stomp around meetings speaking about “bridging the two-culture gap”, but when 
scores of people from outside the sciences begin to build just that bridge, they recoil in horror and 
want to impose the strangest of all gags on free speech since Socrates: only scientists should speak 
about science!” (Latour, 1999: 17). Academic and linguistic differences are further highlighted by the 
differential intelligibility of disciplinary sensibilities serving to make academic boundaries just that. 
Therefore, opening ourselves up to, and the ongoing facilitation of, interdisciplinarity (what 
Skrydstrup (2013b) terms: “epistemic trading zones”) will be crucial to collectively tackling the many 
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issues life on earth is facing and the fostering of creative solutions. For Skrydstrup (2013b: 225), 
epistemic trading zones are about “genuine interdisciplinary encounters” and the ways in which 
exchanges across epistemic communities might help foster a dialogue that moves beyond any one 
discipline and toward a shared space of knowledge practice. Understandings of our world and tackling 
our shared challenges demand collaborative, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research, where 
intellectual barriers are broken and we are able to climb out of our academic silos and build bridges.  
Within the natural sciences, disciplinary and epistemic boundaries are further being created 
through new technoscientific objects and machineries of ever more specialised knowledge 
production. Here, Morgan discusses barriers to interdisciplinarity within the sciences: 
 Science I think is becoming more factioned and fractioned… we’re almost going 
to, you know, kind of Tower of Babel where people aren’t even speaking the same 
languages as much anymore… if you look at big universities now, they’ve not only got 
more departments, but within the departments they’ve got more specialisations than they 
used to have… it also means that each of those areas now builds up its own language and 
its own way of thinking about things and although we have massive access to information 
and more meetings and more conferences and more interdisciplinary meetings, it is really 
hard to understand what somebody in an area of science even closely related to yours but 
not yours is doing and what they’re thinking… which is another reason why you have to 
have 20 people now in a grant as opposed to 3 because you need somebody who is an 
expert in all of the different things you want to do. So I think it is, it’s getting harder to do 
things that are tied together properly, it’s hard to understand what other people are 
doing, you just have to trust them, to accept that they are good at what they do and they 
are genuinely doing something that’s positive for the overall piece of science that you 
want to do. 
The machineries of knowledge production in the sciences are becoming increasingly complex, 
where the flow of knowledge is hindered by technological as well as epistemic barriers. The 
proliferation of ever more finely focused forms of specialization arguably now yields an imperative for 
integration. Lindsey gives an example of legal policy and scientific epistemologies in tension with one 
another, admitting: 
When the minerals regime was being negotiated, I was more active then, in 
conservation movements and lobbying for the alternative for Environmental (Madrid) 
Protocol. But I must admit I found it incredibly difficult reading through drafts of treaties 
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or whatever, all the legal language, very difficult to get my mind around and I think a lot 
of scientists are probably like that. 
Where differing disciplinary epistemic communities may clash, epistemic cultures may shift 
the focus to addressing the bigger picture collectively.  
“Strong academic boundaries also influence the scope of inquiry in as far as both the political 
regime and SCAR subscribe to the narrow English-speaking definition of ‘science’” (Elzinga, 2017: 103). 
As Elzinga (2017) points out, the German ‘Wissenschaft’ is much broader describing the holistic 
process of knowledge production, from collection to dissemination encompassing the humanities and 
sciences, a point which Francis, an Antarctic humanities researcher, discusses: 
 In German… we are all Wissenschaftler, but we are Geisteswissenschaftler, 
humanities researchers, and Naturwissenschaftler, natural scientists, and… I am [a] 
Geisteswissenschaftler, and when I translate it… I am a humanities scientist, and they said 
that doesn’t fit together, it’s contradictory. 
There is power in language as “language participates in giving meaning to and shaping these 
boundaries, it is important whose definitions prevail” (Asdal et al., 2007: 29). Thus, there are arguably 
more philosophical discussions to be had within SCAR regarding terminology and epistemology. 
Power in Language 
 
The ATS operates in four languages: English, Spanish, French and Russian, the linguae francae 
at the time of negotiation of the Treaty. As discussed in chapter three, the geopolitical context leading 
to the signing of the Treaty continues to have a significant impact on the regime today, one of the 
most visible examples of this is through language. Many identified linguistic access within the ATS as 
an ongoing challenge (Elzinga, 2017; Kerry; Alex; Maja; Jo; Matias; Robin; Lou). Kerry, for example, 
describes challenges to participation at the ATCM:  
I’ve seen smaller delegations struggle at the Treaty meetings because they don’t 
speak one of the four Treaty languages and part of it isn’t just about participation on the 
floor of the Treaty meetings but it’s being able to talk to your colleagues on the margin in 
a way that’s meaningful… it’s even more difficult when the meeting is over, there’s a series 
of intersessional contact group discussions set up and they’re all in English… so you always 
see strongly those English as a first language countries and the countries who have, like 
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Germany and things, strong English language abilities, they are the ones that are 
participating in the intersessional discussions, not the other countries. 
One of the flow-on effects of such linguistic challenges and access is that much Antarctic 
scholarship is written from the same perspective and by people from a narrow group of countries as 
Robin discusses: 
I think that’s the kind of discussion we need to have from differing perspectives… 
most people writing about the Antarctic are Anglo-Saxons, Western Europeans, 
Australasians you know and it seems to me we actually need people from India and China 
to be writing books about the Antarctic which somebody translates… we need wider buy-
in to create ownership of the Antarctic in its loosest sense and so don’t see very much 
evidence of that happening but it could. 
The lack of diversity amongst voices in the wider Antarctic research community and the 
subsequent potential for future scholarship is also noted by Robert et al. (2016: 6) who remark that 
“the fact so much of the material considered canonical is by white, male and native English-speaking 
voices is in itself indicative of the opportunities that remain for scholars”. My participants, too, as 
discussed previously, are biased towards the Anglosphere.  
Antarctic states, in particularly Consultative Parties (CPs), are often scrutinised in terms of 
how active they are within the ATS. Relative levels of activity are quantified in terms of papers within 
the ATS as well as scientific publications where both papers and publications are an indication of 
participation in the system (see Dudeney & Walton, 2012). However, as Karsten discusses, non-English 
speaking states are further disadvantaged within the structures of such approaches: 
That’s the other difficulty, if you’re trying to make an assessment of the 
performativity in terms of research papers if they’re written in long non-English or non-
Anglo-American languages then they don’t rate them in the same citation index. 
Knowledge: Education, Outreach & Policy 
 
The flow of knowledge between different groups within the wider Antarctic community and 
the global public was much discussed during my interviews. The possession of, loss of, the desire to 
gain and the dissemination of knowledge were frequently cited in reference to policy, education and 
outreach. For instance, many felt that the urgency of climate change research and data conveyed was 
at odds with the slow pace of policy uptake, with a lack of information flowing adequately between 
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scientists and policy-makers often cited (Johannes; Robin; Jo; Karsten; Lou). This is also a point Matias 
raises in reference to the gaps between policy and science and, advocating for a broader possession 
of knowledge within Antarctic epistemic structures and cultures in the future:  
I’m a scientist and all my team members, all my students and everybody that 
works with me I really like for them to be very familiar with these three dimensions; the 
science, the education and outreach, and policy-making and how they work together… 
One of the major issues that we need to tackle now is that you don’t have many people 
that have these different dimensions in one single person, usually you have a scientist who 
just does science, you have an educator that just does the education and you have the 
policymakers who just do the policy-making. 
Furthermore Matias and Jo both go on to implore Antarctic researchers to be involved with 
education, outreach and continued support for early-career researchers. For example, the importance 
and value of the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS) within the wider Antarctic and 
polar research communities was repeatedly mentioned (Matias; Jo; Kerry; Maja). Kerry similarly 
expresses the importance of support for early-career researchers to ensure knowledge flows into the 
future: 
I just think we have to continue to do the best we can to educate early career 
people to ensure that they spread out and throw themselves into these areas where they 
can intelligently speak about the consequences and related changes in the Antarctic to 
the rest of humanity and continue to ensure that Antarctic research is acknowledged and 
supported still. 
The dissemination of knowledge between Parties within the ATS is identified as an area where 
improvements can be made. Matias, Kerry, Robin and Lou all agree that the quality of the knowledge 
and the quality of people at the meetings is crucial to the direction and functioning of the system in 
the long run. As Lou states:  
There is a lag there and yet by the same token some of those governments are 
still investing in science and research that they want done on the issue of climate change, 
so I think the need for knowledge, the understanding that there is a need for knowledge 
is there, I think commitment to change from a policy and governmental perspective is still 
very much behind the eight ball… I’m not really seeing effective flow of science knowledge 
into those discussions… we need good quality information flowing and regularly and we 
need parties to be seized by what that information is telling them. 
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The ‘flow’ of knowledge and information within the wider Antarctic research and governance 
communities was an often repeated phrase. This fluidity of knowledge within given networks was 
always discussed in terms of its potential. The Antarctic Environments Portal was set up as a means to 
address this flow and access of information between science and policy where SCAR could play a more 
active role (Elzinga, 2017). Here, Robin discusses further challenges to the flow of information 
between science and policy: 
I think another factor in most of our societies is that there is very limited 
penetration by scientists into our parliaments… so I think there is a conceptual problem 
that they have in actually understanding the language within which climate change is 
described and I don’t think that they’re professionally well-equipped to understand risk as 
a concept… I think there is an internal problem that we’ve had, which is the rarefied 
language within which at least initially climate change and other complex issues were 
discussed although I don’t think that’s a fair criticism of most climate scientists today, I 
think one thing they’ve learned in the last 10 years is how to project simple stories without 
compromising intellectual rigour. 
Furthermore, the prevalence of discussions on education and outreach implies a “one way 
flow of knowledge and information… it presupposes that one group has all the answers while others 
lack them” (Hebdon, Lennon, Ludlow, Zhang & Dove, 2016: 389). Hebdon et al. (2016) go on to argue 
that we need a shift of power and focus that addresses the interest and stakes that different 
communities have in climate change mitigation. 
Values 
 
The values ascribed to Antarctica are multifarious and continue to evolve with time (Neufeld, 
O’Reilly, Summerson & Tin, 2014). The Antarctic Treaty refers implicitly to peace and the scientific 
value of Antarctica. The Madrid Protocol recognises values of environmental protection and 
conservation for Antarctica as well as explicitly acknowledging the “intrinsic value of Antarctica, 
including its wilderness and aesthetic values”. There are numerous studies that have explored 
Antarctic values (Neufeld et al., 2014; Summerson & Bishop, 2011; Liggett & Hemmings, 2013; McLean 
& Rock, 2016). As Neufeld et al. (2014) have found, globally, many value Antarctica as a utopian 
wilderness, undisturbed by humans with high instances of a desire for environmental protection 
expressed. During discussions with my research participants, narratives of protectionism and of an 
environmental consciousness came through strongly (Kerry; Lou; Jo; Matias; Lindsey). Here Lindsey, 
an Antarctic biologist recalls the concern amongst researchers in the late 1980s as mining in Antarctica 
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was being discussed during negotiations around the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA):  
I’ve got personal experience of it… when the minerals convention was being 
negotiated, I organised a petition of Antarctic scientists… who were saying we don’t want 
the minerals convention ratified and it would have had… about 100... scientists who had 
had Antarctic experience… and only a handful of them would have said no, so the large 
majority were in favour [of signing], otherwise we wouldn’t have put the thing together 
and presented it… Now whether it’s still the case, I wouldn’t be at all surprised that it is, 
I’m pretty certain it would be really, so that is an indication, quite a strong indication of 
attitudes I think. 
The evolution of Antarctic values and the motivations behind them need to be understood in 
the context of values within societies globally (Neufeld et al., 2014). As discussed in chapter three, the 
Antarctic Treaty was influenced by the Cold War geopolitics of the time, which we see reflected in the 
ATS today. Moreover, in the late 1980s environmental considerations came to the fore in the global 
psyche with demands for environmental protections for the Antarctic increasing (Elzinga, 2013; 2017; 
Neufeld et al., 2014). Furthermore, Neufeld et al. (2014) discuss how the different values that Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) bring to the system will continue to evolve over time and at 
different rates, a challenge to be continually negotiated and renegotiated in order to bring greater 
equity into the system. 
Antarctica has come to represent climate change on a scale not seen on any other continent 
(O’Reilly, 2017). Antarctica is the “laboratory where climate change is depicted in real time… and over 
millennia” (O’Reilly, 2017: 147). As a result, Antarctic research communities (in particularly scientific) 
can be considered to share an epistemic culture through a shared consensus on climate change and a 
shared desire for mitigation. Unsurprisingly, thoughts and insights into climate change were implicit 
throughout my interviews. 
Alex describes the situation thus: 
You can’t really learn about Antarctica and not be confronted with how it’s 
threatening to change or how it has changed or how people fear it is going to change… 
you can’t not have that and be working in or engaging with Antarctica and any way I think 
it’s inseparable. 
Jo recalls conversations with colleagues regarding climate change:  
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This is one of the things I often talk about with my scientist colleagues as well, 
and they’re saying but the facts you know the facts are there, we just need the facts. It’s 
not the facts that we need it’s actually looking at those value systems and what people 
think are important and how can you bring those kind of facts and that knowledge that 
we have about the world, to integrate it with those worldviews and you know to touch on 
those different values.  
Here, differing epistemic communities may be seen to be in friction with one another where 
their understandings and ideas about causes of a shared and agreed upon problem (i.e. climate change 
inaction) differ. “Fostering pessimistic scenarios has become part of a global regime of anticipation 
featuring a new epistemology, which exerts power effects on the public and citizens” (Skrydstrup, 
2017: 72). Understanding the epistemic structures within institutions through which climate change 
knowledges are disseminated is important. The urgency and concern about climate change expressed 
by those interviewed will be discussed further in chapter five.  
The importance of HASS in Antarctic research and within wider climate change research is 
crucial. “It is not overstating the case to say that uptake and acceptance of this information by the 
human population is going to be of paramount importance in the next several decades. Research is 
urgently required to track current knowledge pathways, identify key actors and suggest improved 
routes for delivery.” (Steel, 2015: 4). Robin provocatively suggests: 
Scientists aren’t necessarily very bright or aware about things which aren’t 
science. So it may well be that some scientist believes that the most important thing in 
the world is them getting through a funding round so they can go down and study algal 
systems in a freshwater lake in the dry valleys, but I don’t necessarily think that’s a very 
good judgement about what the most important things are that we have to do in 
Antarctica right now, similarly, even in the area of climate change, we’re dripping with 
data and it’s not making the slightest bit of difference to government policy in most of our 
countries, I sometimes wonder whether more climate research should be in the hands of 
psychologists and sociologists to try and explain why the hell we are so reluctant to do 
anything about a clear and present danger and less to glaciologists and physicists. 
Representing and communicating climate change is crucial for mobilising populations and 
governments alike to take seriously the imminent threats to life on earth. Where “trying to produce 
more and more precise facts can become an excuse for not making good use of the facts we already 
have.” (Frodeman et al., 2003: 31). Climate change pedagogies, communication and dissemination of 
37 
 
knowledge are urgent, but they must move beyond the dominant framings and discourses of “fear 
and their dissolution” (Hulme, 2008: 5) and address the intimacy of the relationship between nature 
and culture. As Hebdon et al. (2016: 388) argue, “to be successful, pedagogies need to foster abilities 
to think ecologically and to discern how human agency is implicated in this “natural” disaster”.  
Media, Narratives & Representations 
 
“The very designation of the Antarctic as the “continent for science” is of course a 
representation – a very powerful one, which resonates with the icescape itself, a giant white laboratory 
coat with its connotations of objectivity and impersonality.” (Leane, 2011: 150) 
Contemporary Antarctica is most often represented visually by images of glaciers, icebergs 
and penguins or through climate models of warming temperatures and has come to be the reluctant 
pin-up for global anthropogenic climate change through such representations. Mainstream media 
engagement with the Antarctic must move beyond a reduction of the continent to one-dimensional 
images of ice or charismatic megafauna if we are to see a meaningful engagement with the issues 
facing the continent. Lou, an Antarctic policy expect with years of experience advocating Antarctic 
issues, expresses: 
Very little about the geopolitics of Antarctica is ever communicated, I’ve struggled 
for years to get seniors within (NAP) aboard to understand the importance of the 
governance regime, because it just isn’t visible to so many people, it’s a group of officials 
that go to a meeting once a year and talk, you know that’s the perception. 
Robin goes further, addressing the complexities of Antarctic geopolitics whilst critiquing the 
prevalence of nationalist agendas in media engagement, and opines: 
How would you persuade a New Zealand audience that their outrage about 
Japanese whaling is perfectly legitimate but they’re going to go nowhere if they say ‘the 
Japanese whaling in our waters’, if they try to frame Japanese whaling in the Ross Sea as 
the Japanese sticking the finger up to New Zealand when only three other states in the 
world recognise New Zealand’s claim to the Ross dependency. Now that’s not something 
that lends itself to a kind of simple fluffy animal story. 
[…] 
I get called most weeks by journalists wanting to do a story or to get background 
about some kind of story around policy, but now they already know the answer before 
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they speak to you, they already know that China is the cause of the problem, and so what 
they really want is you as an authority to confirm the predetermined, right? And if you 
don’t do, you find that story doesn’t go anywhere… and if they don’t provide something 
that fits within the expected framework they don’t get to sell it and so it doesn’t appear. 
So and I think that’s quite an acute problem because a kind of infantilises the kind of 
Antarctic debate. 
Here we see how narratives of Antarctic issues can become entwined within predetermined 
oriental framings of the world (Said, 2003 [1978]), giving rise to a ‘Polar orientalism’ (Dodds and 
Hemmings, 2013), a term I will return to in the chapter five.  
The majority of researchers interviewed were cynical of the way in which the mainstream 
media has engaged with the Antarctic (Lou; Jo; Robin; Kerry), with differing sympathies. For 
representations of the Antarctic, there is a hierarchy of certain knowledges and an authority that 
particular representations gain (Hedbon et al., 2016; O’Reilly, 2017). For example, O’Reilly (2017) 
discusses the charisma of Antarctic climate change data and models, highlighting the authority 
anticipated climate change narratives gain such as for example the imagery showing the disintegration 




Antarctic knowledge is practiced and produced in multifarious ways. Knowledge flows across 
and between overlapping networks and becomes coded through different epistemologies, disciplinary 
subjectivities and academic languages. Understanding the epistemic structures and institutions 
through which Antarctic knowledge is practiced and produced will be important to address both 
disciplinary hierarchies and frictions and will aid future interdisciplinarity through the creation and 
facilitation of epistemic trading zones. Knowledge is situated. It is produced through specific 
institutional structures and machineries and is grounded in time and place. Epistemic cultures, 
highlight the settings, machineries and institutional arrangements of knowledge production through 
practice. There are numerous languages that emerge and operate within Antarctic communities, both 
academic and other and often come to operate as barriers to meaningful dialogue, participation and 
collaboration. Education and outreach are important tools for facilitating greater engagement and 
knowledge dissemination on Antarctic science, governance and climate change issues. There is a need 
to have conversations about the complexities of Antarctic issues that are in open dialogue and move 
beyond recreating hierarchies of knowledge possession or practice.  
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“The point is to embrace epistemic diversity and reflexivity while stimulating further thinking, multi-
disciplinary consultation, and debate on future research agendas in our fledging field.”  









Time, Uncertainty and the Future  
 
“The world we are living in is, in many respects, an illusion. Or, to put it more precisely, it is 
founded on illusions. That is, much that is conventional, taken-for-granted, the ‘way things are’ does 
not stand up to close examination. The affluent Western world has become entranced by its wealth, 
its success and its ever more compelling technological prowess. But it pays little more than superficial 
attention to the consequences of its spiralling demands, to the ways it constantly transfers costs 
elsewhere and ‘elsewhen’ into the ever-receding future. Short-term thinking has become the norm 
and it protects us from ever taking seriously our collective attempts to consume the future.”  
(Slaughter, 2004: xxi) 
 
Contemporary discussions of Antarctica and Antarctic research invariably yield insights into 
hopes, predictions and concerns for the future. There are many temporalities at play in and on the 
Antarctic; ice cores that produce a proxy of climate conditions millennia ago, historic sites and 
monuments of previous eras of Antarctic exploration, contemporary bases and field sites, modern 
universities, research centres and international meetings across the globe that construct and dissect 
Antarctica in multifarious ways, to the models and minds that predict an Antarctic yet to become. I 
use ‘temporality’ here to refer to the interconnections between time, history and chronology, where 
temporality is “seen to encompass a pattern of retensions from the past and protentions for the 
future” (Ingold, 2000: 194). Antarctic research communities and individuals within such communities 
have uncertain futures; from individual job and funding security, to organisational upheavals, national 
regime changes, to regional and global trends, actions and inactions. Discussions, perceptions and 
future predictions penetrate across the many scales that Antarctic researchers are situated within, 
where future anxieties do not care for disciplinary boundaries. The anxieties, hopes and ambitions of 
some of those researching the Antarctic have been gathered during my interviews and, echoing 
Liggett, Lamers, Tin and Maher (2014: 348) “future scenarios… draw a near unanimous and sobering 
picture”; that in changing political and ecological climates, existing management practices are 
insufficient to achieve comprehensive protection for both Antarctica and the rest of the planet. 
Antarctic futures, like those elsewhere, become constructed through multifarious temporalities where 
time cannot simply be understood as chronological and linear pertaining to the past, present and 
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future (Nielsen, 2011; Pink & Salazar, 2017) but demands a much more nuanced understanding of how 
time interrupts and intersects through different temporalities.  
Historically, futures have been imagined from an anthropocentric viewpoint; that is, one in 
which futures were made and shaped by human agencies alone and where nature and the natural 
world were merely a backdrop for human society (Granjou, Walker & Salazar, 2017). However, in the 
Anthropocene (a term I will return to shortly), this is changing; the very way in which we conceive of 
futures must attempt to comprehend temporalities beyond dualistic understandings of a culture 
separate from nature, and account for the more-than-human worlds we cohabit and co-create 
(Haraway, 2008) and where anticipated crossings of human-induced “biophysical thresholds” 
(Granjou et al., 2017: 9) potentially spell catastrophe for us all. The ability to anticipate and know the 
future has been a feature and fascination of civilisations through the ages where forecasting has taken 
many forms (see Adam & Groves, 2007 for more), allowing us to plan and prepare for what is yet to 
come. Anticipating the future always involves moving between multiple temporalities as we organise 
ourselves in the present in relation to our past and to our unknown futures (Nielsen, 2011), and where 
understanding the interdependencies of time and space is crucial to imagining, shaping and making 
futures. As Adam and Groves remark; “engagement with the future is an encounter with a non-
tangible and invisible world that nevertheless has real and material consequences” (Adam & Groves, 
2007: xv). The relative stability or rapidity of societal change significantly alters relations to the future 
(Adam & Groves, 2007; de Jouvenel, 1967) and future anticipations too affect the way in which we act 
and respond in the present in combination with our past experiences, epistemologies and ontologies. 
Forecasting provides a means for creating structural security through knowledges and knowledge 
practices which know and interpret the yet to come and make visible the invisible (Adam & Groves, 
2007).  
Critical views predominate in futures literature, and my research findings are in line with the 
work of others exploring futures both generally (Slaughter, 2004; Anderson, 2010; Salazar, Pink, Irving 
& Sjöberg, 2017) and in an Antarctic context specifically (Tin, Liggett, Maher & Lamers., 2014; Salazar, 
2015; 2017). Such concerns over potential futures are real, are experienced far and wide, and demand 
to be considered thoughtfully. Antarctic researchers tend to be passionate Antarcticans, and there is 
apparent consensus about protecting the continent they study, evidenced through numerous 
expressions of an environmental consciousness and ideals of protectionism for the continent (see 
Neufeld et al., 2014 and chapter four for more). The resultant concerns and uncertainties of both a 
changing physical environment and changing political and funding environments are causing 
measurable and tangible anxieties for the professional and personal lived realities of the Antarctic 
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researchers sampled. I did not set out to capture thoughts and perceptions on the future, but such is 
the nature of the Antarctic that long-term thought, planning and consideration are part and parcel of 
engagement with the Antarctic. Antarctica is changing, and whether or not the instruments charged 
with governing, protecting and managing it are flexible enough to respond as the planet and the 
continent changes has been subject to much debate (Tin et al., 2014; Hemmings, 2017; Elzinga, 2017; 
O’Reilly, 2017; Dodds, 2010). This chapter will explore the numerous Antarctic futures offered through 
manifestations of concern and uncertainty, hope and ambition within Antarctic research, through 
external global geopolitics, internal factors within the ATS, funding and climate change. I will conclude 
with a discussion of the many predicted Antarctic futures, through the use of models and simulations, 
experiences in and with the Antarctic and to the many desired Antarctic futures.  
External Global Geopolitical Concerns 
 
In chapter three I discussed how, aside from processes linked to Antarctic governance, global 
geopolitics have significantly influenced Antarctic research agendas, directions and funding through 
various enabling and disabling factors. Where chapter three addressed historical geopolitical 
influences, this section explores geopolitical concerns yet to be fully realised, global geopolitical trends 
and the nature of operating within uncertainty.  
In 2016 a number of significant political events shook research communities across the world 
(Blyth & Matthijs, 2017). The ramifications and consequences of these events have yet to play out in 
full, and the uncertainties of two in particular, came up repeatedly during my interviews: the United 
Kingdom leaving the European Union (EU), i.e. Brexit, and the Trump presidency in the United States. 
While the prevalence of these two events during my interviews does speak to the Anglosphere bias of 
my research participants, the events are globally significant and speak to worrying trends towards the 
political right, to new manifestations of nationalisms and the rise of populism as we begin to see a 
second wave of cold war geopolitics globally (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Blyth & Matthijs, 2017; 
Gusterson, 2017) already influencing the Antarctic and Antarctic research, as will be discussed. Of the 
Antarctic researchers I spoke with, there was clear and collective anger in response to the above 
events and about the uncertainty both globally and for the Antarctic as the many vulnerabilities of 
new known unknowns are yet to reveal themselves. Whilst the implications of Trump’s election were 
described with language such as “going backwards” and “wildcard”, and Brexit inspired the use of 
“bonkers,” the note of real concern and anxiety was not possible to miss across all those interviewed.  
Lou, with 30 years’ experience in Antarctic policy at various levels representing numerous 
countries said:  
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I worry about what’s going to happen… under a Trump administration where we 
may well see a significant reduction both on climate change research more generally but 
also in Antarctic research… those changes I think are worrying rather than giving hope… 
there are real challenges and Antarctic science is expensive, it’s not cheap to do it and 
often an easy thing for governments to pull back on to save money. So yeah generally I’m 
concerned about what the future holds, for the system generally, for science and for the 
place, for Antarctica itself. 
Similarly, Kerry who heads an Antarctic organisation discusses anticipated challenges for the 
ATCM:  
There’s a huge amount of change… when new political parties take over in a 
country, the US is a very good example right now… if Trump and his Republican Party 
decide to cut science funding then that will certainly have a drop-down effect on the 
National Science Foundation’s ability to do Antarctic science, because Antarctic science is 
expensive. 
Both Lou and Kerry express concern about potential future changes for Antarctic research 
resultant from a change of political regime and the US. In the present, they do not anticipate that 
Antarctic research will continue to be funded into the future by a regime in the business of climate 
change denial and because the cost of Antarctic research is high. 
The unknowns of Brexit too are causing consternation amongst a number of those 
interviewed. Morgan, a senior researcher at a prestigious Antarctic research institute commented: 
Brexit is going to make a difference... I was on two groups developing grant 
applications for the EU before Brexit and now I’m not involved in either of them because 
all the partners are worried having a Brit on it is going to make it less successful… I think 
that it is going to get harder, there are all sorts of questions about the UK government, 
[they] have promised to replace funds that are lost from Europe, how they’re going to do 
that at the moment we don’t know... the current feel that we get from the government is 
they want their science to be supportive of industry and that’s harder in the Antarctic than 
it is elsewhere… it’ll depend a lot more I think on the flavour of the government in the UK 
in the future and where they put their emphasis. There’s a general decrease in our ability 
to do things because of the way the politics has gone in Antarctic science in the UK over 
the last 10 years and it might be that where we’re going is better for the UK plc (public 
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limited company) in general but at the moment for the people who are, if you like, career 
Antarctic scientists, especially biologists, it’s a lot worse than it was. 
Political change has resulted in significant unknowns for Morgan having already been asked 
to leave two research projects because of the uncertainties of the Brexit vote, who then extrapolates 
that funding environments, in particularly for Antarctic research will likely be worse in the future 
because the science does not readily support industry in the UK. Kenward (2016) notes similar 
concerns as he discusses the early manifestations of uncertainty and doubt resulting from the Brexit 
vote for research communities within the UK and the friction it is already causing across some research 
communities within the wider EU. 
The most recent US election of an administration of climate change denialists is a significant 
blow to an international community collaborating over climate change issues. The troupe of climate 
scepticism, denial, alternative facts and fake news have all been employed by the US government in 
response to the risks posed by anthropogenic climate change. As Latour (2015: 149) states “the 
deniers’ success is not to win any argument, but simply to make sure that the rest of the public is 
convinced that there is an argument. How could the poor helpless climatologists ever win in such a 
kangaroo court where the point is not to reach a verdict (the verdict has been reached in the IPCC 
report already anyway).” At the time of writing, the US has officially pulled out of the Paris Climate 
Accord, further illustrating the relationship between political instability and the production of 
uncertainty (Nielsen, 2011). As Beck (2006b: 330) discusses (albeit 11 years earlier, still applies): 
“whoever believes in not-knowing (like the US government) increases the danger of climate 
catastrophe”.  
Societal stability is directly linked to our abilities to forecast and as a result heavily influences 
our relationship with the future (Adam & Groves, 2007). In the Communist Manifesto for example, 
Marx and Engels (2012 [1848]) describe the parallels between the new modes of production of 
industrial society and the coproduction of uncertainty that accompanies such rapid expansion and 
change: “constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, 
everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones” (Marx & 
Engels, 2012: 77 [1848]). Here, Marx and Engels draw attention to the development of the relationship 
between constant societal change and uncertainty, a point that de Jouvenel also discusses in detail: 
“The fewer changes we anticipate, the more we can continue to rely on our knowledge for the 
future. If society tends on the whole to conserve the present state of affairs, our present knowledge 
has a high chance of being valid in the future. On the other hand, the future validity of our knowledge 
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becomes increasingly doubtful as the mood of society inclines toward change and the changes promise 
to be more rapid” (de Jouvenel, 1967: 10). 
The responses to the instability and uncertainty caused by Trump and Brexit and situated 
within the wider context of a changing climate are illustrative of how “political transformations affect 
subjective capacities for future orientation” (Nielsen, 2011: 398), whereby it is difficult to contend 
with research ambitions when the very future of the structures and values that enable the research 
may be in jeopardy. Morgan’s comments further draw our attention to another area of uncertainty in 
Antarctica: commercial interest.  
Commercial Interest 
 
Commercial interests and activities in the Antarctic are increasing and presently involve 
tourism, fisheries and biological prospecting (Hemmings, 2017). Commercial interests are not new 
phenomena in the Antarctic. However, it is a new blurring of boundaries between science as a public 
good and profitable science that risks further exposing vulnerabilities within the ATS that have yet to 
be resolved and threaten to challenge notions of Antarctica as a continent of peace (Hemmings, 2017). 
As discussed in the two previous chapters, the values that are attributed to and pursued in the 
Antarctic are reflective of concerns within wider global society, initially through concerns about 
militarisation and resource extraction to environmental concerns and protection of the continent. The 
concerns around increasing commercial interest are concerns about access, influence and the 
potential for changes in power dynamics within the system, which have further potential to influence 
long term decision making within the ATS. Commercial interests bring another set of values altogether. 
For instance, Robin worries:  
I think it’s [increasing commercial interest] going to have a profound effect 
because it will mean that the kind of values which are being pursued by the separate 
Antarctic programs and which are then melded together internationally, the kind of 
values framework will have changed rather dramatically… The question is whether 
scientific cooperation remains feasible… for states and also whether the focus on science 
is now a sufficiently robust glue to hold the Antarctic Treaty system together and I’m not 
so sure on the second point that it is. 
Johannes, a glaciologist notes his reliance on data from international satellites, the many 




More and more countries… try to get sensors up into space and so it’s more and 
more commercialised so there are more and more commercial sensors, so there is a lot of 
data available but of course much of the data are not necessarily useful for our purpose… 
we need satellites which keep measuring surface elevation, we need satellites which keep 
measuring ice flow and ice flow variability, but these are also satellites and technology 
which is very hard to commercialise so it needs a commitment also from governments to 
invest money to keep that type of technology going so this is important… we cannot take 
it for granted that the data keeps flowing… we have to work on that. 
Where Robin has concerns about the potential control and lobby within the system that 
commercial interest and influence may have in the future, for Johannes, commercial usage would 
provide a means to secure access and ongoing flow of data, where government investment is viewed 
as less secure.  
There are ongoing issues surrounding the acquisition of Antarctic data from multiple 
platforms – in, above and outside Antarctica and where the boundary is drawn. Interpretative 
flexibility of Article III of the Treaty which states “scientific observations and results from Antarctic 
shall be exchanged and made freely available” has the potential to add another layer of complexity. 
Ironically, as Elzinga (2017) notes, much of the Cold War surveillance technology (for example 
satellites and remote sensing) is now enrolled in science in the Antarctic. 
Nationalisms 
 
“National science programmes do all sorts of valuable science for us, but until our governments really 
get serious about climate change, the thing they do par excellence is fly the national flag.”  
(Hemmings, 2017: 508, original emphasis) 
The rise of new nationalisms globally are a worrying site for many researchers particularly 
those expert in Antarctic policy where this new wave and shape of nationalisms are exposing fragilities 
in the Antarctic governance regime (Hemmings, Chaturvedi, Leane, Liggett & Salazar, 2015; 
Hemmings, 2017). There is a rich body of critical scholarship on Antarctic nationalisms that I will not 
survey in depth here (see Hemmings et al., 2015; Dodds, 2017b for more). Nationalisms in the 
Antarctic were discussed during a number of interviews, with many expressions of concern about their 
potentially destabilising effects (Robin; Maja; Lou; Karsten). For example Lou discusses: 
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The shift towards nationalism, heavily towards nationalism in a number of 
countries, in Europe, the US and elsewhere, the desires of some players like Russia and 
China to either state or reinstate themselves as global leaders from a nationalist 
perspective is concerning, particularly when you think in Antarctica that that was kind of 
the very thing that the treaty system was set up to overcome in the first place, was 
individual territorial claims, we’ve gone from a very nationalistic approach to Antarctica 
to a much more global engaging system and I think if we start to see a disintegration of 
that where countries are actually looking at their own domestic interests of being in the 
Antarctic or not, then I think it could be undermining. 
This is an irony not lost on Hemmings (2017: 513) who describes the ATS as a “Cold War 
management tool”. Robin too discusses concerns if new nationalisms manifest in the Antarctic:  
The Antarctic system depends upon the suppression of aggressive autonomy 
because it depends upon collaboration and so if the nationalism runs away in Antarctica, 
even at a much lower level than what alarms you elsewhere in the world, my concern is 
that it undercuts international collaboration. 
Enduring colonial legacies in the Antarctic in the contemporary world has lead Dodds (2017b) 
to refer to ‘Awkward Antarctic nationalism’ and what he calls the present “awkwardness of being a 
claimant state in Antarctica” (Dodds, 2017b: 16). He illustrates the interconnections between the 
historic colonial legacy of a state with contemporary views on colonialism and the awkward task of 
mediating between them. “There is no one ‘post-colonial Antarctic’; rather it is means of recognizing 
that colonialism is never fixed in the past, and that the past must be invoked to make sense of the 
present” (Dodds & Collis, 2017: 65). There are multifarious temporalities at play within the 
technocratic structures that govern the ATS.  
Furthermore, as touched on briefly in chapter four, the increasing interest and participation 
in Antarctic science and governance of Asian states in particular, as well as other non-western states, 
has been met with suspicion (Hemmings, 2017; Dodds & Hemmings, 2013). ‘Orientalism’ in the 
Antarctic as Hemmings (2017) illustrates, takes many varieties but is invariably framed through the 
rubric of the ‘rise of China’ (note Robin’s experiences with journalists in chapter four). Here, Robin 
discusses manifestations of ‘Polar Orientalism’ in the Antarctic:  
You see for example scientists or science managers arguing at appropriations 
hearings to get money for their national programme that they are falling behind country 
X. Well country X is invariably China, and… what you begin to see them saying is that it’s 
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essential that we do the science, whereas I would have thought the objective need is for 
the science to be done, I mean why would it matter in fact whether the breakthrough in 
science say climate change is done by a Chinese scientist rather than an American or a 
New Zealander or whatever, I mean if the science project has the confidence in the 
intrinsic merits of science, which is part of what’s underpinned the role of science in the 
Antarctic Treaty system in the eyes of the scientists, then surely it shouldn’t have this 
hypocritical stance which seems to suggest that some practitioners of science in the 
Antarctic are inferior, well why would the Chinese Antarctic program be inferior, or even 
if they’re not inferior, their breakthroughs are undesirable. That’s back to a kind of Cold 
War mentality… and I think that’s corrosive in the long run where we begin to see this 
adversarial relationship right at the heart of the Antarctic communal project that is 
Antarctic science. 
This idea of states competing through science is also evident in the Australian narrative of a 
‘race’ to discover the first one million year old ice core (Dodds, 2017b). There a rise of neo-colonial 
nations in the Antarctic challenging the current hegemon (Dodds & Collis, 2017), where traditional 
Antarctic states fear future marginalisation, which can be expressed both through explicit and more 
inconspicuous forms of nationalism and orientalism. Dodds & Collis (2017: 52) illustrate the complex 
temporal arrangements and relations between the many Antarctic pasts, presents and futures: 
 “The past is very much in evidence in the present, stubbornly persisting through such 
categories as hierarchies of knowledge, experience and language, which enable white, Euro-American, 
and Anglophone worlds to emerge as hegemonic; even if postcolonial and International Relations (IR) 
scholars are increasingly grappling with the etymologies of ‘China/Asian’ rising powers and its 
implications for a post-colonial encounter shaped by spatial divisions between North and South”. 
Internal ATS Concerns 
 
Globally, many value Antarctica as a utopia (Neufeld et al., 2014: 248), protected 
environmentally, largely untouched by humans, and aesthetically stunning; Antarctica is often cited 
as ‘the last great wilderness’. Such idealism is not in the minds and experiences of those interviewed. 
As discussed in chapter four, the many values inscribed on the continent externally in addition to those 
brought into the system by the numerous players are changing over time, are reflective of an evolution 
of values within global society more broadly speaking, and are reflected through the evolution of the 
Antarctic Treaty System (see Neufeld et al., 2014). However, as will be discussed, the incorporation of 
values into the Antarctic governance regime is not fluid and continues to reflect the global hegemon 
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of the Cold War era in which the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated. As a result, many see this inequity 
as a threat to the very legitimacy of the system both presently and crucially into the future too should 
the status quo remain (Hemmings, 2014; 2017; Dodds, 2010; 2017a; Dodds & Collis, 2017; Elzinga, 
2013).  
While manifestations of nationalism globally present new challenges in the Antarctic and 
around its governance, the ATS has yet to adequately deal with shortcomings in relation to equity 
within the regime itself threatening to undermine the regime’s legitimacy (Dodds & Collis, 2017; 
Hemmings, 2017). As discussed in chapter three, equity within the Antarctic governance regime has 
been much debated, the legal instruments and norms were set by the global hegemon of the 1950s 
and the modus operandi remains fixed (Hemmings, 2017). The need for the regime to become more 
responsive to current global politics with an incorporation of a wider array of global values is necessary 
if it is to receive greater commitment, investment and legitimacy (Hemmings, 2017; Tin et al., 2014). 
However, as Hemmings (2017: 510) discusses; “the sense of entitlement that the earliest Parties still 
feel they have” reifies unequal power dynamics within the system whereby the previously ‘traditional’ 
Antarctic states (i.e. the original 12 Treaty signatories) “perceive their profiles and influence to be in 
relative decline” (Hemmings, 2017: 510). Lou discusses future challenges for the ATS as follows: 
The challenge is to have an adequate and effective governance regime that is 
contemporary, addressing the issues that need to be addressed, that it has charged itself 
with addressing by establishing the regime in the first place and that there is sufficient 
commitment from governments either through research funding or support to the 
International governance regime Secretariat, sending people to meetings to make it 
effective into the future, that’s the challenge. There is a risk, I think that it just slowly 
becomes a more and more moribund organisation because of that lack of commitment, 
lack of interest on the part of governments, so something has got to change in order to 
generate that long-term or that desire to see the system operate in the long-term and I’m 
not seeing it at the moment… governments pulling funding back, British Antarctic survey 
going into something of a decline, arguments over contributions at meetings, lack of an 
adequate agenda, all of those are indicators to me that the system just isn’t quite doing 
what it really should be doing so that’s the challenge. 
There are many temporal implications highlighted through Lou’s comments. For instance the 
use of the word, moribund, the etymology of which suggests a terminal decline, illustrates an 
understanding and experience of the system functionally operating during a time in which there was 
greater commitment on the part of governments. Lou further extrapolates future likelihoods of 
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governments ‘pulling funding back’ through an understanding of present signals to anticipate the 
future. Moreover, Lou demonstrates how a normative understanding of the role of the ATS both in 
theory and in practice and, in the past and presently, has led to the conviction that it is not fulfilling 
this role: ‘what it really should be doing’. 
Matias too, illustrates temporalities at play, discussing present and potential future challenges 
for the ATS: 
What we do in the Antarctic will be an example to the rest of the world and I think 
the Antarctic Treaty will go on being very stable but things could deteriorate very quickly 
if the lobby of the fossil fuels continue and says shall we explore it or not the minerals in 
the Antarctic, I think it won’t happen … I’m hopeful and I think things will be alright, but 
it I think it’s the political part of the puzzle that we need to be more conscientious of it will 
be the hardest challenge. 
For Matias, the assertion that the ATS ‘will be an example to the rest of the world’ provided 
the system is not undermined by the pursuit of commercial values shows an awareness of the 
potential power the fossil fuel lobby wield and the destabilising effect this could have on the ATS, 
should it become susceptible in the future. Matias, like Lou alludes to future political challenges 
illustrating the interplay here between the real and the ideal. 
Kerry sees challenges to the ATS too: 
I think the biggest challenge facing the governance arm of the Antarctic Treaty 
system is ensuring that the systems and organisations outside of the Antarctic understand 
the critical issues relating to the Antarctic, we need to make sure that areas outside the 
Antarctic that are having policy decisions made for them understand what impact indirect 
human activity is having on the Antarctic… I think we’ve been very bad as a community to 
do that, the Antarctic community is very insular we have our own little ways of doing 
things and terminology and we try to keep that to ourselves and we go to the meetings 
and we walk away and we don’t feed that into the other arms of the governance system, 
the global governance system so I think we have to do better at that. 
For Kerry, the challenges to the ATS are external and about the networks of relations between 
the internal institutional structures within the Antarctic community and those externally whose 
decisions could impact the Antarctic. Kerry alludes to an insider/outsider dynamic within the ATS and 
the language the community has built up as a barrier to the flow of information to external governance 
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structures. Moreover, for Kerry the assumed implication is that external decisions made without an 
appreciation or consideration for the Antarctic will adversely impact Antarctica. 
There appears to some agreement amongst those interviewed and the literature that the ATS 
is not operating at its potential, where there is an understanding of ideal and desired ATS operations 
and understandings of its real operations. “Current environmental management practices and 
regulatory mechanisms will not be sufficient to address the environmental challenges in a warmer and 
busier Antarctic in the twenty-first century and beyond” (Liggett et al., 2014: 348). Here we see how 
“the future emerges as anticipation inscribed in the present” (Nielsen, 2011: 398). 
Funding & Research Directions 
 
As touched on in chapter three, a significant enabler of Antarctic research is funding. Funding 
can be a significant cause of consternation for any researcher, impacting abilities to make potential 
projects tangible and capacities to practice research into the future. Funding emerged as a recurring 
theme during my interviews.  
Johannes explains: 
Funding is of course critical, we cannot do it without funding and… we would like 
to do more but quite often… there are restrictions to funding. 
Similarly, Morgan states:  
 Getting funding to do the research is crippling us… I don’t have the ability now to 
ask what I think are fundamental questions in the Antarctic. 
Francis too, expresses: 
What I also need all the time is funding and it’s always from one year to the next 
so I don’t know if I can continue… it’s really tiring and I’m sometimes a little bit frustrated 
and getting a little bit cynical. 
Thus, the temporal implications of an uncertain and contestable funding environment are 
significant. Uncertainties and the often accompanying frustrations become extrapolated into the 
future, impacting upon research directions (Johannes; Alex; Francis; Morgan), scope (Johannes; 




Funding is also a central focus of the uncertainties expressed over Trump and Brexit as well as 
how funding environments are changing. As mentioned earlier, Brexit has already affected 
involvement in upcoming research projects for Morgan, drawing attention to the human dimension 
and experience within broader geopolitical contexts. In order to secure funding there are many 
bureaucratic imperatives to be negotiated, as Lindsey discusses: 
The scientists want to attract funding from the National funding agencies and to 
do that nowadays it’s got to be shown to be internationally relevant, you know all the 
usual things, multidisciplinary, international research, team research, focused on 
important questions which are recognised as important by the science community… and 
if you don’t do those things you won’t get the money hence they go through this exercise. 
Lou feels: 
A lot of bureaucracy and administration is absorbing those costs when that could 
be spent on science. 
Such funding environments are by no means unique to the Antarctic research community but 
will have an impact on the future directions of Antarctic research.  
Future directions of Antarctic research have been rigorously discussed since scientific 
exploration on the continent became inscribed in the Antarctic Treaty (Hanessian, 1960; Hambro, 
1974), when new levels of environmental regulation came in with the Madrid Protocol (Herr et al., 
1990; Elzinga, 1993a) and most recently through the SCAR Horizon Scan leading to the Antarctic 
Roadmap, which sets out a vision for the future of Antarctic research over the next 20 years by 
identifying 80 priority areas for future research (see Kennicutt et al., 2014; 2015 for further detail). 
The Horizon Scan was carried out by researchers for researchers, specifically addressing research 
ideals in abstraction. The COMNAP Antarctic Roadmap Challenges (ARC) projects directly builds upon 
the Horizon Scan research to explicitly address the questions of how to enable the research set out 
during the Horizon Scan (Kennicutt, Kim & Finnemore, 2016). New partnerships to secure and enable 
future Antarctic research have been discussed and public-private partnerships may be sought to 
address research and funding requirements, whereby the ATS will need to be open to working with 
new stakeholders. 
Therefore, there is an acknowledgment that knowledge, abilities, technologies, materials, 
resources, access, and logistical support as discussed are all important enablers for the performance 
and realisation of Antarctic research. However, it is ultimately funding that becomes a mechanism for 





 “Researching environmental futures requires us… to destabilize the disciplinary patterns of the social 
construction of reality in order to confront the autonomous and outside reality of the future… [and] 
to become more attuned to the fact that humans and societies do not own and shape “their” future 
alone. Environmental futures are definitively “more than human” futures.” (Granjou et al., 2017: 8) 
“Species interdependence is a well-known fact—except when it comes to humans. Human 
exceptionalism blinds us.” (Tsing, 2012: 144) 
 
The Polar Regions are warming faster than any other and have come to represent climate 
change. As a result, we see Antarctica situated and constructed as a place of climate change (O’Reilly, 
2017: 14) through multifarious knowledge practices, representations and narratives (see O’Reilly, 
2017 for further discussion). As discussed in chapter four, Antarctic research communities can be 
considered ‘epistemic communities’ for climate change knowledge with shared values and agreed 
upon sets of knowledge. The uncertainties of climate change were implicit during large portions of my 
interviews and explicit during all discussions about Antarctic futures where concerns are dual: for the 
Antarctic itself, and for elsewhere where anthropic industrial practices continue to directly impact the 
Antarctic environment. “Modern society has become a risk society in the sense that it is increasingly 
occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself has created” (Beck, 2006b: 332). 
The Anthropocene, a term that has been much problematized (Latour, 2015; Helmreich, 2016; 
Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2015; Haraway, 2015), draws our attention to the influence that humans are 
having on planetary changes, “the final rejection of the separation between Nature and Human that 
has paralysed science and politics since the dawn of modernism” (Latour, 2015: 146). The prominent 
discourse of futures of climate fear and catastrophe are linked with neoliberalism and the emergence 
of a “world risk society” (Beck, 2006b; Hulme, 2008). “Climate science lost its innocence with the 
Hockey Stick and… the business of going public with science irrevocably means politicising science” 
(Skrydstrup, 2017: 77). 
The science-policy gap was repeatedly mentioned during my interviews, where the pace and 
uptake of scientific knowledge within policy both within the ATS and globally was a cause of 
considerable concern. Johannes discusses:  
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It’s almost scary how slow it is, I mean and also how this knowledge is taken up 
and ignored, largely ignored… it’s the timescale I think… even 10 years, thinking 10 years 
out is difficult, I think it’s the problem of the timescales, of the climate, I mean by definition 
climate is the mean state of our weather or environmental conditions… over say several 
decades and to change climate or to see climate change it takes long. 
Johannes draws our attention back to time. We see a collision between the numerous 
different timings at play; cultural time, political time, geological time and climate time. There is a 
discrepancy between scientists’ discussions of geological and climate time, which centre on for 
example, the atmosphere, sea level rise and associated probabilities; science time, with an absence of 
a human dimension. On the other hand, there is ‘real time’ operating at a much more urgent pace 
with for example unprecedented flooding across disparate parts of the world and larger and more 
intense storms. Here, we see natural disasters set within a wider framework in which scientific 
investigation follows frequencies and probabilities of a predictable nature and in which scientific 
funding is itself implicated within social, political and bureaucratic timings. With vastly different 
epistemologies, scales and temporalities at play, Helmreich (2016: 115) calls for a need to “calibrate 
geological time to social time”. Time and the climate become formalised within computer models and 
simulations, but what do these formalisms mean in human terms? O’Reilly (2017: 148) argues that 
climate change narratives “rely on multiple temporal shifts that can obfuscate the stories and 
cautionary tales being told”.  
Johannes and Matias both discuss the need to keep documenting and collecting good quality 
data on climate change in the Antarctic. Johannes discusses: 
From a science point of view, I mean what the political conclusion is, this is up to the policy 
makers of course, but the only thing what we can really try to do is that we enhance the knowledge in 
a way that we have, that we find a better basis for decisions, that we can predict better the changes 
and the consequences, I think this is what is really really urgent. 
Johannes situates the research and policy as separate but interconnected through the 
epistemic technocracy of the ATS. Johannes expresses hope that improved data will lead to 
meaningful policy action and the contribution the research has towards this goal. 
A number of the Antarctic researchers interviewed expressed a sense of pride about their 
research and firm belief in the contribution their science is making within the wider context of climate 
change information and the need for a continued effort in the Antarctic, ensuring good quality data 
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keeps flowing. For example, Matias an Antarctic scientist working with a prestigious Antarctic research 
institute makes this prideful assertion: 
I think what’s the most important, is that… you feel special… it takes a lot of time 
to collect the samples, so when you finally publish the paper, by the media interest and 
the implications on policies that it has, all the scientists I mean particularly me and my 
colleagues in my team we feel very privileged to go to the Antarctic to collect samples, 
you feel that you are doing something for the planet you’re not doing something that 
people don’t care [about], you feel that the rest of the world cares. So, when you come 
from an Antarctic trip, you know the media is very interested in what you found out, why 
it’s important, all these issues are really relevant like sea level rise, climate change is it 
really happening in the Antarctic… so we repeat the message almost every year adding 
everything that we are finding out there that year. 
Matias’ prideful assertion at the privilege of helping making a contribution highlights the 
human dimension of the individuals behind Antarctic research. Matias expresses hope for the future 
and the tangible practices that will make a positive change for our shared futures.   
“We are not dealing here with indisputable “matters of fact,” but with “matters of concern” 
to be disputed. It is a question of knowing “uncomfortable facts” about pressing issues that concern 
the very soil on which every body resides” (Latour, 2015: 150). 
 
Technologies, Models & Simulations 
 
The demand for predictive science is increasing (Skrydstrup, 2017; Granjou et al., 2017) and, 
as a result in Antarctic and climate science the “machineries of knowledge production” (Knorr Cetina, 
2007) are also becoming technologies of anticipation. The challenges lie in managing uncertainty and 
risk. In order for governments to attend to future risk, risk must be brought into the realm of the 
manageable. “Contemporary political decision-making is a forward-looking process, which therefore 
produce a demand for science-based predictions” (Skrydstrup, 2017: 72). Hence, models and 
simulations become tools for expert extrapolation, risk mitigation and management. These operate 
with and through multifarious temporalities in Antarctic research. Here we see the past used in the 
present to extrapolate an anticipated future, which will in turn (in theory) help us in the present to 
make decisions about that very future. We are therefore no longer talking about a real world, but a 
proxy, a constructed, predicted and anticipated world. 
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Johannes explains anticipated future research: 
For glaciology I think it’s quite clear that… new data strategies and getting more 
data, getting better ground validation data so at least the same maybe the faster pace 
we will get a better understanding how the ice sheet really works, we will have better 
models, so probably in 10 years’ time we will be at the stage where meteorology is maybe 
today, that we are able to predict the change on the Antarctic ice sheet depending on how 
the ocean and the weather is changing, so I think this is kind of the route that we’re going. 
Moreover, here Johannes predicts when they may be able to better predict. Johannes goes 
on to state: 
What we really need to try to achieve is that we really get better at telling what’s 
going to happen, that we get more accurate at how will the planet look like in 50 years’ 
time or in 20 years’ time. 
Morgan discusses the losses of knowledge perceived with the increasing use of models: 
I don’t think we’re there with the models to have the same overall breadth and 
depth that you would get from somebody who had spent a lot of time understanding how 
organisms function as a physiologist. We might get there in 10 years’ time, where you can 
literally do most of it on a computer but I think there’s lots of caveats there. It’s much 
harder to see where the problems with your data are if you’ve not actually done those 
sorts of experiments, and before somebody who’s running those models hasn’t done any 
of those experiments and doesn’t understand the limitations of what the experiments are 
telling you whereas like I say 25-30 years ago there were people who had done literally 
thousands of experiments on groups of marine animals and you could go and talk to them 
about how muscles work in this way and they could tell you, whereas now you can’t. 
Morgan has an understanding of the time required to gain an intimate knowledge physically 
working with given groups of animals and running experiments. Morgan therefore sees a decline in 
this intimate knowledge as the popularity of and demand for predictive aspects of science using 
models increases. Here, the implication is that moving towards the use of proxies and codes, one may 
lose their grounding in the present and knowledge of the very subjects which they aim to study.  
“The main ethical motivation and financial justification for this globalised research effort in 
climate is to allow better understanding and prediction of our climate in order to manage it in better 





Human engagement with the Antarctic spans multiple temporalities. Time, uncertainty and 
the future emerged as prominent themes throughout my interviews. Our conversations moved fluidly 
between knowns and unknowns, fears and triumphs, empiricisms and abstractions. Anticipation of 
the future always involves moving between multiple temporalities as we organise ourselves in the 
present in relation to our past and to our unknown futures (Nielsen, 2011). Antarctica is changing and 
the current governance policies and structures in place will not be flexible enough to respond to both 
a changing political environment and a changing climate. Forecasting allows us respond in the present 
to our anticipated futures, but societal and political instability and change lead to the production of 
uncertainty. In the Antarctic, commercial interests and new waves of nationalism threaten an already 
vulnerable regime, creating anticipated future political challenges. Antarctic researchers operate 
within these modes of uncertainty. We are living a risk society. Anthropogenic climate change 
threatens the very future of our planet. As a result, climate scientists are more often called upon to 
conduct their research in the anticipatory mode, using models and simulations to predict a future yet 
to come and to bring the unknown into the realm of the known and manageable (Granjou et al., 2017). 
The machineries of knowledge production in Antarctic science are increasingly technologies of and for 
anticipation. Granjou et al. (2017) present a strong case for the use of foresight to address 
environmental and political concerns over hindsight, while Nielsen (2011: 398) argues for “a view on 
anticipatory action which takes seriously those ‘possible worlds’ which, although not yet realized, 
inform people’s everyday actions”. We must acknowledge our responsibility and “response ability” 
(Haraway, 2008: 88) in collectively shaping our more-than-human preferred futures. 
“Social learning, if it occurs at all, is often slow, crude and can be very expensive. It appears that our 
species, while familiar with foresight, often fails to employ it until forced to do so. In other words we 
seem to require some sort of painful ‘learning experience’ before we will trust our foresight 







Research efforts in the Antarctic require a very deliberate mobilisation of materials, resources 
and personnel, a choreography performed in multifarious ways across the world. Antarctica becomes 
imagined, enacted and practiced across universities, international meetings, and by domestic 
governments. The geopolitical history of the Antarctic is saturated with competing nationalisms, and 
today national agendas are threatening to spill over into the Antarctic as we see a rise of populism 
within neoliberal globalisation. There is a friction that emerges from Antarctic research. The icy 
continent is a place designated for the peace and ideally apolitical science but these ideals are at 
conflict with the reality of a highly politicised and internationally fragile space. The mismatch between 
scientific knowledge and policy change are a great source of frustration as time interrupts and 
intersects, weaving between the different epistemic structures of Antarctic engagements. Ice cores 
describe the Antarctic continent millennia ago, models predict an Antarctic 10, 20, 50 years from now, 
and all taking place within the here and the now as we decide and align ourselves and our 
management practices in relation to these predicted futures. We seek to bring the risk of operating in 
Antarctica and the Antarctic continent itself into the realm of the manageable. Power, hierarchy and 
uncertainty are recurring themes throughout this dissertation. Antarctic researchers have to navigate 
the technocratic structures which determine the conditions and possibilities of their practice.  
Materiality 
 
Antarctica has a rich history of research endeavour that has taken many forms since human 
engagement with the continent first began. Engagement with the Antarctic is deliberate, one does not 
stumble upon the icy continent by chance. Material semiotics provide a framework for exploring the 
materialities of Antarctic research and how networks of Antarctic knowledge are produced. Material 
semiotics is suitable for conceptualizing the complex assemblages of Antarctic research, including 
technoscientific objects, expertise, and political and governance structures. The relationship between 
Antarctica and science emerges through the machineries of knowledge construction, where research 
becomes enacted through multiple webs of heterogeneous relations and empirical practices in which 
it is embedded. My research has sought to understand the role of matter and meaning with regard to 
the enactment of research practices and the subjectivities they produce for practitioners. Modes of 
engagement with the Antarctic became formalised through the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, and henceforth 
the continent has been constructed as a place of international cooperation and scientific 
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internationalism, peace and science. Science became embodied within the very fabric of Antarctic 
engagement, the ‘currency’ of influence in Antarctica and has consequently been politicised within 
the system.   
The geopolitical context within which Antarctic engagement was negotiated is significant for 
the subsequent structures and institutions that have emerged and become the ATS, a form of colonial 
and technoscientific governance. Colonial legacies remain present through the privileged status 
original signatories continue to enjoy. The Antarctic Treaty is a noble ideal, sublimating international 
political rivalry into international scientific cooperation and collaboration. The roots of entrenched 
national interests remain deep as, for instance, highlighted by the fact that there is still no truly 
international Antarctic research station. International scientific collaborations in the Antarctic are 
grounded in the material practices and encounters through relationships between individual 
researchers, especially as Antarctic research requires a large-scale mobilisation of resources, 
materials, personnel, expertise, policy and governments.  
In this dissertation I have sought to show how Antarctic knowledge is practiced and produced 
through specific epistemic and institutional structures and is grounded in time, space and place. The 
intentions and motivations of the institutions involved in Antarctic knowledge production and practice 
are complex. There are discrepancies in time between policy creation and government response, 
serving to slow down decision making processes within the ATS, much to the frustration of Antarctic 
researchers and policy makers alike. Logistical and infrastructural support are fundamental enablers 
of Antarctic research. The physical location of Antarctic bases and the relationships with NAPs, impact 
research participation, design and practice. Antarctic science thus becomes a choreography of practice 
between policy, expertise, logistics, materials, and equipment. Access emerges as an important 
enabler of Antarctic research, and includes access to the continent itself, to people, and to 
information. Technoscientific objects describe and translate the Antarctic environment into past 
histories, present truths and anticipated futures. Antarctic research is enacted, translated, practiced 
and embedded in the material relations that helped produce it.  
Knowledge 
 
Epistemics are a conceptual tool for analysing the institutional arrangements that shape 
knowledge production. There are numerous epistemic knowledge practices within Antarctic research 
that make up “how we know what we know” (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 1). Epistemic communities 
constitute groups that share sets of knowledge, values and agreed upon means to assess them. An 
epistemic technocracy draws our attention to the political arrangements within which epistemic 
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communities are produced. An epistemic cultural approach employs the tools of material semiotics 
and is concerned with the machineries of knowledge production and their construction. In this 
dissertation I have sought to show how certain knowledges come to be privileged by epistemic 
structures, including the communities of practice and the technocratic structures through which 
knowledge is produced. For example, within SCAR, the institutional arrangements highlight tensions 
between different epistemic communities of researchers. The peace and science rhetoric of the 
Antarctic Treaty has seen a privileging of, and a preference for natural sciences and a resultant 
marginalisation of the humanities and social sciences. Antarctica has become figured as laboratory, a 
metaphorical figuring that reifies a position of power to the natural sciences. The personal experiences 
of these epistemic structures for a number of those interviewed results in frustrations. Antarctic 
fieldwork, much like fieldwork for socio-cultural anthropologists, functions as a rite of passage, of 
group membership and implied commonalities, but many Antarctic researchers do not experience the 
ice, and the legitimacy conferred serves to exclude.  
Antarctic researchers organise themselves as a place-based community. Arguably, this 
positions Antarctic research well for collaboration and interdisciplinarity, but interdisciplinarity 
subjects researchers to many barriers. Academic languages result in differential intelligibility of 
research making academic boundaries just that. The increasing complexity of technoscientific 
machineries has meant that even branches of the natural sciences that are closely related speak 
different languages. These epistemic barriers need to be addressed head on, and SCAR would be well 
positioned to facilitate such epistemic trading zones.  
The differential treatment of Parties within the ATS and also the privileging of signatory states 
over non-signatory states was cause for further concern and remains an ongoing challenge. There are 
only four linguae francae in the Antarctic Treaty System, with intersessional discussions largely taking 
place in English. Therefore, meaningful participation and engagement is accessible only to those with 
reasonable English language abilities. We see a flow-on effect into Antarctic research whereby much 
that is written about the Antarctic is by native English speaking voices.  
Education, outreach and communication of Antarctic issues were important topics of concern. 
The dissemination of Antarctic knowledge and, in particularly climate change knowledge, to the wider 
public and policy makers was seen as a fundamental obligation for Antarctic researchers. Antarctic 
values are complex and continue to evolve with time. Expressions of protectionism and an 
environmental consciousness are commonplace within Antarctic research communities and within the 
global community with reference to the Antarctic. Concern about climate change, and urgency for 
climate change action, featured strongly in all of my interviews with Antarctic researchers. Antarctic 
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representations in the media are a point of concern as debates seem to be fit within predetermined 
framings where Antarctica is represented as a one-dimensional space of penguins and icebergs. 
Temporality 
 
There are many temporalities at play in an Antarctic context. They construct and dissect 
Antarctica or predict an Antarctic yet to become. Antarctic futures become imagined through a range 
of temporalities, where time cannot simply be understood as pertaining to the past, present and 
future but demands a more nuanced understanding of how time interrupts and intersects through 
different temporalities. Futures have historically been imagined as shaped by human agencies alone, 
with nature merely a backdrop for human society. In the Anthropocene, a time of unprecedented 
human-induced climatic change, this cannot be the case. We organise ourselves in the present in 
relation to our unknown futures, but political and societal stability affects our subjectivities and our 
capacity to think into the future. The prevalence of the concerns over Brexit and Trump speak to the 
bias in my sample towards Antarctic researchers from the Anglosphere but also serve to ground this 
research in 2017 and the global political uncertainties of the present.  
Increasing commercial interest in the Antarctic blurs boundaries between science as a public 
good and profitable science, exposing vulnerabilities within the ATS that have yet to be resolved. New 
nationalisms in the Antarctic will potentially have a destabilising effect on the system, one of the very 
things it was set up to address in the first place. There is an ongoing awkwardness of being a claimant 
state in Antarctica, highlighting the continued colonial legacies within the system and multiple 
temporalities operating within the ATS. ‘Polar Orientalism’, which views with some suspicion the 
motives for Antarctic engagements of Asian states in particularly, and of other Eastern states, has 
manifested itself within the Antarctic and Antarctic research. One of the many challenges that have 
been identified within the ATS relates to a certain imbalance of power between ATCPs and non-
consultative parties, which has been inscribed in the ATS from its inception and risks its legitimacy into 
the future. Here, “the future emerges as anticipation inscribed in the present” (Nielsen, 2011: 398) 
and highlights the tension between a noble ideal and reality. Funding contingencies are a significant 
stress for researchers too, rife with uncertainties into the future.  
As mentioned previously, climate change came through repeatedly during my interviews. 
There is concern about the pace with which the scientific knowledge is being generated as compared 
to the pace with which the knowledge is being taken up by policy. There is a mismatch between the 
numerous timings at play, where policy change does not reflect the urgency expressed. The demands 
for predictive science are increasing, and as result we see the increasing use of technologies of 
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anticipation. A key challenge relates to the management of uncertainty and risk. In order for 
governments to attend to future risk, risk must be brought into the realm of the manageable. Time, 
uncertainty and the future are recurring themes and concerns in Antarctic research, where 
engagement with preferred Antarctic futures today will help shape engagement into the future. 
Research Contributions & Future Directions 
 
This research illustrates the frank and human side of experience within these broader 
contexts, and provides insight into how researchers experience the technocratic apparatus within 
which they research through ethnographic and anthropological methods and analyses. While the 
utility for generalisation is limited, this research speaks to the configurations, contestations, and 
experiences of Antarctic research. Semi-structured interviews provide a snapshot, a glimpse into the 
realities and experiences, of a select number of Antarctic researchers. There many ways to describe 
the Antarctic and many ways to be an Antarctic researcher, just like there are multifarious imaginings 
of Antarctica, depending on whose perspectives – individuals’, nation states’, institutions’ – one 
considers, Antarctica is many things to individual researchers as it is many things to individual nations 
and to nations collectively. Antarctica is not static but in a state of becoming and is shaped and situated 
through different knowledges, epistemologies and ontologies. Antarctica is one thing whilst 
simultaneously many others. Antarctica is a convenience (intergovernmental cooperation over 
science) and an inconvenience (harsh and isolated). Antarctic descriptions transcend all three tenses 
as it becomes predicted, modelled, manipulated, speculated, imagined and preferred. Antarctica is 
numeric and linguistic. Antarctica is the litmus test for the rest of the world, for global change, and its 
future is inextricable from climate change, entangled within narratives of the Anthropocene and 
practices of climatic anticipation. “To state the fact and to ring the bell is one and the same thing” 
(Latour, 2014: 4). Antarctic futures are made and shaped through epistemic communities and an 
epistemic technocracy of the ATS, but all states have a stake in Antarctica’s future, and soon they will 
all need to have a voice too. Antarctica is a place premised for interdisciplinary encounters, a place-
based international research community with a communal project at its core. We must reassess the 
relationships between nature and culture through thinking with climate change, cultural change and 
global change through epistemic trading zones, redrawing and dismantling intellectual boundaries. 
We need meaningful engagement with the future today, to make visible to invisible as we collectively 
shape and make our preferred Antarctic futures. 
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“To withdraw inside the narrow limits of nation-states is the surest way to threaten the 
safety and livelihood of those same nation-states, and even, for some low lying countries, to risk their 
existence altogether.” (Latour, 2016: 2) 
 
“Half of our politics is constructed in science and technology. The other half of Nature is constructed 
in societies. Let us patch the two back together, and the political task can begin again… It is up to us 
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